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Mind: A Brief Introduction (FUNDAMENTALS OF PHILOSOPHY) ハードカバー – 2004/11/1
英語版
John R. Searle
(著)
"The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." In Mind, Searle dismantles these famous and influential theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. Here readers will find one of the world's most eminent thinkers shedding light on the central concern of modern philosophy. Searle begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as the freedom of the will, the actual operation of mental causation, the nature and functioning of the unconscious, the analysis of perception, and the concept of the self. One of the key chapters is on the mind-body problem, which Searle analyzes brilliantly. He argues that all forms of consciousness--from feeling thirsty to wondering how to translate Mallarmé--are caused by the behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system, which is itself composed of neurons. But this does not mean that consciousness is nothing but neuronal behavior. The main point of having the concept of consciousness, Searle points out, is to capture the first person subjective features of the phenomenon and this point is lost if we redefine consciousness in third person objective terms. Described as a "dragonslayer by temperament," John Searle offers here a refreshingly direct and open discussion of philosophy, one that skewers accepted wisdom even as it offers striking new insights into the nature of consciousness and the mind.
- 本の長さ326ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Oxford Univ Pr
- 発売日2004/11/1
- 寸法13.34 x 3.18 x 19.05 cm
- ISBN-100195157338
- ISBN-13978-0195157338
この著者の人気タイトル
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商品の説明
レビュー
Searle's deeply thought-out naturalism and ontological realism are refreshing and his arguments are rigorous and compelling, which makes this a highly engaging and brilliant piece of philosophical writing for any serious reader to enjoy. (Maria Antonietta Perna, University College London)
著者について
John R. Searle is Mills Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of many books, including The Rediscovery of the Mind, The Mystery of Consciousness, Mind, Language and Society, Philosophy in the Real World, and Consciousness and Language.
登録情報
- 出版社 : Oxford Univ Pr (2004/11/1)
- 発売日 : 2004/11/1
- 言語 : 英語
- ハードカバー : 326ページ
- ISBN-10 : 0195157338
- ISBN-13 : 978-0195157338
- 寸法 : 13.34 x 3.18 x 19.05 cm
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 489,355位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 685位Neuroscience
- - 767位Internal Medicine (洋書)
- - 1,364位Consciousness & Thought Philosophy
- カスタマーレビュー:
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他の国からのトップレビュー
Lems Lucas
5つ星のうち5.0
Excellent Philosophy
2019年3月28日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Searle is a brilliant philosopher, and in this book brings philosophy into the real everyday world.
I recommend it, as a readable, direct, and dazzling account of the human mind.
I recommend it, as a readable, direct, and dazzling account of the human mind.
Matthew Rapaport
5つ星のうち5.0
Well written introduction to the complexities of philosophy of mind
2017年8月25日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Another good book from a good philosopher, Searle's review and proposals concerning the philosophy of mind. He sets out reviewing the dominant threads in the development of philosophy of mind noting and striking at their particular weaknesses. Searle dismisses property and substance dualism but also strikes at the weaknesses of various branches of materialist thinking on the subject. He then proposes his own theory, one that is fundamentally materialistic (physics being for Searle the ultimate basis of all things), but different in that it takes mental properties seriously but rests them firmly on what amounts to "the power and functional purpose of brains".
Searle is an honest philosopher. He states his assumptions, makes clear his reasoning, and knows when his approach to the subject hits a wall that he has not (perhaps yet) found a way round. In this book, like everyone else, he cannot reduce-away the gap between the objective ontology of brains and the subjective ontology of experience. He points out that while every other phenomena in the physical universe can be both logically and physically reduced to some more fundamental phenomena, subjective experience cannot be logically reduced precisely because it is subjective while everything else is objective, public. Of course he assumes that there is some underlying, solely physical, foundation which will become known in time.
The book covers consciousness taken as a whole, a gestalt, and also intentionality (the "about-ness" of our thinking), the aspectral nature of all consciousness, emotions, desires, beliefs, and with these also acts: decisions and volitional control of the body. There is also a chapter on the unconscious, and that too fits perfectly well into his view of what mind is.
Searle runs into two other barriers not normally acknowledged by other philosophers. In a chapter on [libertarian] free will, he says that from a psychological point of view, free will must be real, but from his own view that consciousness is just what the brain does in the same sense that kidneys filter blood, he admits that he cannot figure out how free will could work. He alludes to a popular view that quantum mechanics might have something to do with this, but is honest enough to admit that this idea still does not really answer the question.
The other barrier is that of personal identity, the conviction that although my body and character change I remain, to myself subjectively, the same person today as I was a month or a decade back and that I can plan for the future when, presumably, this same person will still be around to enjoy the fruits of present labor. Here he addresses the "continuity of memory" theory to personal identity and accepts that this is important but is insufficient to explain the phenomenon. That these are MY memories still presupposes some "I" whose memories they are. He denies the "I" is substantive, but merely a functional hypothesis that we must have to make experience intelligible. He admits that he does not know how to get deeper into it than that.
The book is well written (could Searle do otherwise?) with little formality. His assumptions and arguments are clearly made in plain English. It isn't an encyclopedic introduction to the philosophy of mind, but it does touch briefly on the main threads of the field as explored by Western philosophers for the past 300 or so years. His own theory, well expounded, illustrates how subtle and problematic some of the questions in the field can be. A good read. Highly recommended.
Searle is an honest philosopher. He states his assumptions, makes clear his reasoning, and knows when his approach to the subject hits a wall that he has not (perhaps yet) found a way round. In this book, like everyone else, he cannot reduce-away the gap between the objective ontology of brains and the subjective ontology of experience. He points out that while every other phenomena in the physical universe can be both logically and physically reduced to some more fundamental phenomena, subjective experience cannot be logically reduced precisely because it is subjective while everything else is objective, public. Of course he assumes that there is some underlying, solely physical, foundation which will become known in time.
The book covers consciousness taken as a whole, a gestalt, and also intentionality (the "about-ness" of our thinking), the aspectral nature of all consciousness, emotions, desires, beliefs, and with these also acts: decisions and volitional control of the body. There is also a chapter on the unconscious, and that too fits perfectly well into his view of what mind is.
Searle runs into two other barriers not normally acknowledged by other philosophers. In a chapter on [libertarian] free will, he says that from a psychological point of view, free will must be real, but from his own view that consciousness is just what the brain does in the same sense that kidneys filter blood, he admits that he cannot figure out how free will could work. He alludes to a popular view that quantum mechanics might have something to do with this, but is honest enough to admit that this idea still does not really answer the question.
The other barrier is that of personal identity, the conviction that although my body and character change I remain, to myself subjectively, the same person today as I was a month or a decade back and that I can plan for the future when, presumably, this same person will still be around to enjoy the fruits of present labor. Here he addresses the "continuity of memory" theory to personal identity and accepts that this is important but is insufficient to explain the phenomenon. That these are MY memories still presupposes some "I" whose memories they are. He denies the "I" is substantive, but merely a functional hypothesis that we must have to make experience intelligible. He admits that he does not know how to get deeper into it than that.
The book is well written (could Searle do otherwise?) with little formality. His assumptions and arguments are clearly made in plain English. It isn't an encyclopedic introduction to the philosophy of mind, but it does touch briefly on the main threads of the field as explored by Western philosophers for the past 300 or so years. His own theory, well expounded, illustrates how subtle and problematic some of the questions in the field can be. A good read. Highly recommended.
Chris Ziesler
5つ星のうち4.0
Thorough Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind
2014年8月25日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Searle's book provides an excellent overview to both the history of the philosophy of mind and the current state of understanding of this important area. His primary concern is the philosophical but he never shies away from describing how our philosophical understanding of the mind has to be aligned with and informed by neurobiological understanding and research.
What I found most refreshing about Searle's approach was his ability to ground his arguments in everyday experience and common sense. He systematically works his way through a sequence of thorny philosophical topics: the mind-body problem; consciousness; causality; free-will; perception; and provides a sound and well-argued framework to understand why these issues have caused such deep debate between philosophers over the years and the gives his own view as to the best resolution.
He is completely candid about where the limits of our current knowledge are and which problems will benefit from more scientific research and which problems need better philosophical research.
I found that in the sections dealing with specifically philosophical arguments, for example the section on Intentionality-with-a-t compared with Intensionality-with-an-s, the philosophical vocabulary made the material dense and opaque, but Searle brings back the topic to concrete examples wherever he can which found helpful.
One aspect of the book that I found a little disappointing was that Searle only touched very lightly on Artificial Intelligence and the possibility of machine-learning and consciousness. Given that he has been so involved in that debate - see The Chinese Room thought-experiment - I had hoped that he might have included more discussion of this important current topic.
Overall, I very much appreciated his style which mixed a comprehensive knowledge of the subject with humor and insight.
What I found most refreshing about Searle's approach was his ability to ground his arguments in everyday experience and common sense. He systematically works his way through a sequence of thorny philosophical topics: the mind-body problem; consciousness; causality; free-will; perception; and provides a sound and well-argued framework to understand why these issues have caused such deep debate between philosophers over the years and the gives his own view as to the best resolution.
He is completely candid about where the limits of our current knowledge are and which problems will benefit from more scientific research and which problems need better philosophical research.
I found that in the sections dealing with specifically philosophical arguments, for example the section on Intentionality-with-a-t compared with Intensionality-with-an-s, the philosophical vocabulary made the material dense and opaque, but Searle brings back the topic to concrete examples wherever he can which found helpful.
One aspect of the book that I found a little disappointing was that Searle only touched very lightly on Artificial Intelligence and the possibility of machine-learning and consciousness. Given that he has been so involved in that debate - see The Chinese Room thought-experiment - I had hoped that he might have included more discussion of this important current topic.
Overall, I very much appreciated his style which mixed a comprehensive knowledge of the subject with humor and insight.
John Saunders
5つ星のうち4.0
warmly recommended and of the three books I've read covering similar ...
2014年11月20日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Very slight reservations - I'm not surer Searle quite understands some of the difficulties that the new student to philosophy of mind experiences, especially as getting across an interpretation of mind as material. Perhaps I was expecting too much. Nevertheless, warmly recommended and of the three books I've read covering similar ground, I think it is the best.
Kristina Radzeviciute
5つ星のうち5.0
Great book
2021年3月5日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Good book for BSc Psychology students