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Freedom and Reason ペーパーバック – 1977/5/12
英語版
Richard Mervyn Hare
(著)
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購入オプションとあわせ買い
Proceeds in a logical fashion to show how, when thinking morally, a man can be both free and rational.
- 本の長さ240ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Oxford University Press, U.S.A.
- 発売日1977/5/12
- 寸法13.97 x 1.91 x 20.32 cm
- ISBN-10019881092X
- ISBN-13978-0198810926
この著者の人気タイトル
ページ 1 以下のうち 1 最初から観るページ 1 以下のうち 1
登録情報
- 出版社 : Oxford University Press, U.S.A. (1977/5/12)
- 発売日 : 1977/5/12
- 言語 : 英語
- ペーパーバック : 240ページ
- ISBN-10 : 019881092X
- ISBN-13 : 978-0198810926
- 寸法 : 13.97 x 1.91 x 20.32 cm
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 193,397位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 1,129位Philosophy of Ethics & Morality
- - 1,191位Ethics & Morality
- - 2,374位Linguistics Reference (洋書)
- カスタマーレビュー:
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トップレビュー
上位レビュー、対象国: 日本
レビューのフィルタリング中に問題が発生しました。後でもう一度試してください。
スラッシャー愛好家
本書は1960年代に流行した一つの哲学的思想を典型的に表したものです。具体的には著者のHareは、或る人を幸せだと言うときに「what we have to do is to make an appraisal, not a statement of fact」なのだと言い、しかもそのappraisalは道徳的考慮に関わるものだと示唆しています。本書の徹底的な典型振りはその後に、或る人が幸せだと判断することは幸せだと言われる側によるものとは異なる基準に関わっている等々と続くことに示されており、本書は新鮮さというよりは1960年代哲学の一つの流れを求めるのには最適の書だと言えます。
他の国からのトップレビュー
DAVID BRYSON
5つ星のうち2.0
MISSION NOT ACCOMPLISHED
2006年9月29日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Moral philosophy may not be as futile a pursuit as I have long thought it is, but Hare, far from shaking my prejudice, largely created it when I attended his classes 40-odd years ago, and he seems to be out of fashion now. My main objections to this book are these. In the first place it is not clear about what the sphere of morality is. Secondly, Hare tries to make language take more of the burden of moral concepts than it is able to do, and thirdly the linguistic terminology he uses is not very satisfactory. Above all, in a book entitled Freedom and Reason there is next to nothing about freedom from start to finish.
`Moral' comes from the Latin `mores', sc human conduct. However plenty of human conduct does not fall into the classification `moral'. The word belongs to the large (and largely unrecognised) category whose meaning in different instances is determined by some implied opposite. I feel a moral responsibility not to drop litter in the street. I also have a legal responsibility not to, and part of the meaning of `moral' in this case is to distinguish it from the latter. We also talk of a `moral certainty', `moral' meaning `as distinct from mathematical or actuarial', and in this use `moral' has nothing to do with morals. Again, someone may feel a revulsion at slugs and at certain sexual acts. The aversion to slugs is aesthetic, not moral, but if anything is routinely classed as `moral' it is surely sexual conduct. I can't myself see the dividing line in these two cases - what they have in common is an appeal to certain values or tastes, and language does not help with that.
To me, morality all ultimately rests on such an appeal to values. Reason can take these as a basis for argument, but they are not matters of the intellect at all. Hare dutifully parades for us the `utilitarian' school of moral reasoners, who argued for a rational basis of morality founded on the greatest good (or greatest `happiness') of the greatest number. `Good' describes or identifies nothing whatsoever - it is the universal term of commendation according to any standard at all. `Happiness' has done philosophy untold harm ever since Aristotle's `eudaimonia' was first mistranslated as happiness rather than as wellbeing. I may be happy with a certain compromise, in the sense that I'm prepared to put up with it. That is not what's meant by a book having a happy ending, and neither resembles the rosy glow that I may briefly experience from alcohol. `Happy' is another of the words that takes its meaning from its context, and I'd call it perfectly useless as a guide to morality.
Hare conjures up his own language of morals. There are three basic propositions - statements may be `descriptive' or `evaluative': commands or precepts are `prescriptive'; and the essence of a moral precept is that it should be, God help us, `universalizable'. `Descriptive' is rough-and-ready, but it will do if understood (again) as sweeping up the senses excluded by the alternatives. `A red car' is descriptive of the car, but we are into evaluations already with `large' or `loud' as these terms invoke a scale of assessment. `Large' can't be neatly pigeonholed as either `descriptive' or `evaluative'. `This car is large' is evaluative: `this car is too large' is either meaningless or descriptive in the sense of implying that it's too large for the garage or for some other implied purpose. These uses show the unreliability of language as a guide to such categorisation - `too' looks an evaluative word until we think how it may be used. Similarly, imperatives that seem to operate in the moral sphere may be adjudged right or wrong but still descriptive, for reasons unconcerned with moral values. The order `Advance to meet the enemy' can and should be adjudged wrong, but `descriptively' (as well as prescriptively), though not morally, wrong, if the enemy happens to be behind us.
I have no end of problems with `universalizable'. `By calling a judgement universalizable I mean only that it logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgement about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgement or like it in the relevant respects' says Hare. How many begged questions have we here? Any command or precept whatsoever is universalizable - it's a matter of how many people the speaker means it to apply to and at what times and in what places. When the chorus in Housman's Fragment of a Greek Tragedy says to the stranger
`And oh my son be, on the one hand, good
And do not, on the other hand, be bad'
that is as near as language on its own can get to a universal prescription, applicable to all persons, times and places although prescribing nothing in particular. When Polonius says to Laertes
`Nether a borrower nor a lender be'
that is obviously universalizable so far as the language goes, but the extent to which it is universalised has nothing to do with the language. The battlefield command `advance' is universalizable although it would often be ill-advised. Also, what are `the relevant respects'? If I say `Describe respects of your house' I'm talking odd English but at least making sense. If I say `Describe THE respects of your house' I'm talking nonsense. `Relevant' is a conjuring-trick. The word has no descriptive meaning, and to class two decisions as being alike in the relevant respects is to say that they are alike in the respects in which we have deemed them to be alike.
The issue of free will, more interesting and important than everything else in the book, is sidelined, and in a patronising tone that is rather too characteristic. Hare disputes with other moral philosophers at times, successfully no doubt except that in my opinion they're all flailing their own hot air, and although in his introduction he says he will refer to other works of wisdom, in practice his footnotes mainly refer to himself. He didn't clarify moral issues to me all that time ago, and he still doesn't. He deserves to have fallen out of fashion, and a suitably prescriptive and universalizable summing-up for him might be
`Neither a be-all nor an end-all be.'
`Moral' comes from the Latin `mores', sc human conduct. However plenty of human conduct does not fall into the classification `moral'. The word belongs to the large (and largely unrecognised) category whose meaning in different instances is determined by some implied opposite. I feel a moral responsibility not to drop litter in the street. I also have a legal responsibility not to, and part of the meaning of `moral' in this case is to distinguish it from the latter. We also talk of a `moral certainty', `moral' meaning `as distinct from mathematical or actuarial', and in this use `moral' has nothing to do with morals. Again, someone may feel a revulsion at slugs and at certain sexual acts. The aversion to slugs is aesthetic, not moral, but if anything is routinely classed as `moral' it is surely sexual conduct. I can't myself see the dividing line in these two cases - what they have in common is an appeal to certain values or tastes, and language does not help with that.
To me, morality all ultimately rests on such an appeal to values. Reason can take these as a basis for argument, but they are not matters of the intellect at all. Hare dutifully parades for us the `utilitarian' school of moral reasoners, who argued for a rational basis of morality founded on the greatest good (or greatest `happiness') of the greatest number. `Good' describes or identifies nothing whatsoever - it is the universal term of commendation according to any standard at all. `Happiness' has done philosophy untold harm ever since Aristotle's `eudaimonia' was first mistranslated as happiness rather than as wellbeing. I may be happy with a certain compromise, in the sense that I'm prepared to put up with it. That is not what's meant by a book having a happy ending, and neither resembles the rosy glow that I may briefly experience from alcohol. `Happy' is another of the words that takes its meaning from its context, and I'd call it perfectly useless as a guide to morality.
Hare conjures up his own language of morals. There are three basic propositions - statements may be `descriptive' or `evaluative': commands or precepts are `prescriptive'; and the essence of a moral precept is that it should be, God help us, `universalizable'. `Descriptive' is rough-and-ready, but it will do if understood (again) as sweeping up the senses excluded by the alternatives. `A red car' is descriptive of the car, but we are into evaluations already with `large' or `loud' as these terms invoke a scale of assessment. `Large' can't be neatly pigeonholed as either `descriptive' or `evaluative'. `This car is large' is evaluative: `this car is too large' is either meaningless or descriptive in the sense of implying that it's too large for the garage or for some other implied purpose. These uses show the unreliability of language as a guide to such categorisation - `too' looks an evaluative word until we think how it may be used. Similarly, imperatives that seem to operate in the moral sphere may be adjudged right or wrong but still descriptive, for reasons unconcerned with moral values. The order `Advance to meet the enemy' can and should be adjudged wrong, but `descriptively' (as well as prescriptively), though not morally, wrong, if the enemy happens to be behind us.
I have no end of problems with `universalizable'. `By calling a judgement universalizable I mean only that it logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgement about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgement or like it in the relevant respects' says Hare. How many begged questions have we here? Any command or precept whatsoever is universalizable - it's a matter of how many people the speaker means it to apply to and at what times and in what places. When the chorus in Housman's Fragment of a Greek Tragedy says to the stranger
`And oh my son be, on the one hand, good
And do not, on the other hand, be bad'
that is as near as language on its own can get to a universal prescription, applicable to all persons, times and places although prescribing nothing in particular. When Polonius says to Laertes
`Nether a borrower nor a lender be'
that is obviously universalizable so far as the language goes, but the extent to which it is universalised has nothing to do with the language. The battlefield command `advance' is universalizable although it would often be ill-advised. Also, what are `the relevant respects'? If I say `Describe respects of your house' I'm talking odd English but at least making sense. If I say `Describe THE respects of your house' I'm talking nonsense. `Relevant' is a conjuring-trick. The word has no descriptive meaning, and to class two decisions as being alike in the relevant respects is to say that they are alike in the respects in which we have deemed them to be alike.
The issue of free will, more interesting and important than everything else in the book, is sidelined, and in a patronising tone that is rather too characteristic. Hare disputes with other moral philosophers at times, successfully no doubt except that in my opinion they're all flailing their own hot air, and although in his introduction he says he will refer to other works of wisdom, in practice his footnotes mainly refer to himself. He didn't clarify moral issues to me all that time ago, and he still doesn't. He deserves to have fallen out of fashion, and a suitably prescriptive and universalizable summing-up for him might be
`Neither a be-all nor an end-all be.'