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The Problem of Evil ペーパーバック – 2008/6/15
英語版
Van Inwagen Peter
(著)
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It is generally supposed that the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering, much of it truly horrible suffering, confronts those who believe in an all-powerful and benevolent Creator with a serious problem: to explain why such a Creator would permit this. Many reflective people are convinced that the problem, the problem of evil, is insoluble. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as a powerful argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: If there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. Peter van Inwagen examines this argument, which he regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. His conclusion is that (like most philosophical arguments) it is a failure. He seeks to demonstrate, not that God exists, but the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering does not show that God does not exist. Along the way he discusses a wide range of topics of interest to philosophers and theologians, such as: the concept of God; what might be meant by describing a philosophical argument as a failure; the distinction between versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Lisbon earthquake or the death of a fawn in a forest fire; the free-will defense; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.
- 本の長さ198ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Oxford University Press, Usa
- 発売日2008/6/15
- 寸法21.6 x 14 x 1.15 cm
- ISBN-100199543976
- ISBN-13978-0199543977
この著者の人気タイトル
ページ 1 以下のうち 1 最初から観るページ 1 以下のうち 1
商品の説明
レビュー
Review from previous edition 'Van Inwagen must be the clearest writer and the best stylist in analytic philosophy, at least since the passing of W. V. Quine.' ― Ars Disputandi Journal, Daniel J. Hill
'[a] fine book' ― Trenton Merricks, The Times Literary Supplement
'[a] fine book' ― Trenton Merricks, The Times Literary Supplement
著者について
Peter van Inwagen is the O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His many publications include An Essay on Free Will (1983), Material Beings (1990), Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (2001), and Metaphysics (1993, second edition 2002). He has delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of St Andrews, the Wilde Lectures at Oxford University, the Maurice Lectures at the University of London, and the Stewart Lectures at Princeton University. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
登録情報
- 出版社 : Oxford University Press, Usa (2008/6/15)
- 発売日 : 2008/6/15
- 言語 : 英語
- ペーパーバック : 198ページ
- ISBN-10 : 0199543976
- ISBN-13 : 978-0199543977
- 寸法 : 21.6 x 14 x 1.15 cm
- カスタマーレビュー:
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他の国からのトップレビュー
James Macfarlane
5つ星のうち5.0
Five Stars
2017年10月25日に英国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Novel and thoughtful approach to a formidable philosophical problem
Amazon Customer
5つ星のうち4.0
Un dialogo
2016年3月22日にイタリアでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Un dialogo simulato.
1. Credente. Propongo la mia tesi: il male è il prezzo della libertà.
2. Ateo. Ma un uomo libero significa un Dio non più onnipotente
3. Credente. Infatti ti concedo dei limiti all'onnipotenza divina: l'uomo, hai ragione, l'uomo non puo' essere libero per sua natura e contemporaneamente assoggettato ai voleri di un altro essere, sarebbe contraddittorio.
4. Ateo. Eppure un Dio buono limiterebbe i danni donando una libertà compatibilista del tipo "ti concedo di fare cio' che desideri ma decido io cio' che desideri". In questo modo Dio potrebbe instillare desideri buoni senza conculcare la libertà.
5. Credente. Ma la libertà compatibilista non è vera libertà, ciascuno vede quanto è limitata: l'uomo, in ultima analisi, sarebbe comunque determinato da forze esterne.
7. Ateo. Ma il male nel mondo è comunque sovrabbondante!
8. Credente. Come puoi dirlo? Puo' benissimo essere invece che viviamo nel migliore dei mondi possibili. Crederlo non è irrazionale.
9. Ateo. Perché Dio non interviene a limitare il male, almeno le conseguenze malvagie non volute dall'agente, una volta che la libertà umana è stata esercitata.
10. Credente. Potrebbe farlo solo interferendo con le leggi naturali. Dio ha fatto un altro dono all'uomo: la ragione. Se ad ogni istante mutasse il corso delle leggi per fermare le conseguenze non intenzionali danneggerebbe la nostra capacità di conoscere il mondo isolando delle leggi naturali. Senza dire che a volte lo fa, e allora ecco il miracolo. (IMHO)
11. Ateo. Esistono i terremoti, ovvero il male che non dipende dall'azione umana. Che mi dici?
12. Credente. Sono per l'uomo un banco di prova. Ogni uomo è unico, oltreché libero, e Dio per giudicarlo deve metterlo alla prova in modo unico. La nostra salvezza si realizza attraverso una prova unica: se Dio potesse prevedere la nostra reazione in anticipo la nostra vita sarebbe pleonastica. (IMHO)
13. Ateo. Ma da cio' discende che Dio non è onnisciente.
14. Credente. Te lo concedo, anche l'onniscienza divina è limitata: Dio non puo' conoscere cio' che non si puo' conoscere.
15. Ateo. E di fronte alla domanda/invocazione della mamma che ha perso un bimbo e dice perché a me?
16. Credente. Non abbiamo nulla da dirle, noi non sappiamo spiegare il suo dramma: possediamo una teoria generale del male, non una teoria specifica.
continua
1. Credente. Propongo la mia tesi: il male è il prezzo della libertà.
2. Ateo. Ma un uomo libero significa un Dio non più onnipotente
3. Credente. Infatti ti concedo dei limiti all'onnipotenza divina: l'uomo, hai ragione, l'uomo non puo' essere libero per sua natura e contemporaneamente assoggettato ai voleri di un altro essere, sarebbe contraddittorio.
4. Ateo. Eppure un Dio buono limiterebbe i danni donando una libertà compatibilista del tipo "ti concedo di fare cio' che desideri ma decido io cio' che desideri". In questo modo Dio potrebbe instillare desideri buoni senza conculcare la libertà.
5. Credente. Ma la libertà compatibilista non è vera libertà, ciascuno vede quanto è limitata: l'uomo, in ultima analisi, sarebbe comunque determinato da forze esterne.
7. Ateo. Ma il male nel mondo è comunque sovrabbondante!
8. Credente. Come puoi dirlo? Puo' benissimo essere invece che viviamo nel migliore dei mondi possibili. Crederlo non è irrazionale.
9. Ateo. Perché Dio non interviene a limitare il male, almeno le conseguenze malvagie non volute dall'agente, una volta che la libertà umana è stata esercitata.
10. Credente. Potrebbe farlo solo interferendo con le leggi naturali. Dio ha fatto un altro dono all'uomo: la ragione. Se ad ogni istante mutasse il corso delle leggi per fermare le conseguenze non intenzionali danneggerebbe la nostra capacità di conoscere il mondo isolando delle leggi naturali. Senza dire che a volte lo fa, e allora ecco il miracolo. (IMHO)
11. Ateo. Esistono i terremoti, ovvero il male che non dipende dall'azione umana. Che mi dici?
12. Credente. Sono per l'uomo un banco di prova. Ogni uomo è unico, oltreché libero, e Dio per giudicarlo deve metterlo alla prova in modo unico. La nostra salvezza si realizza attraverso una prova unica: se Dio potesse prevedere la nostra reazione in anticipo la nostra vita sarebbe pleonastica. (IMHO)
13. Ateo. Ma da cio' discende che Dio non è onnisciente.
14. Credente. Te lo concedo, anche l'onniscienza divina è limitata: Dio non puo' conoscere cio' che non si puo' conoscere.
15. Ateo. E di fronte alla domanda/invocazione della mamma che ha perso un bimbo e dice perché a me?
16. Credente. Non abbiamo nulla da dirle, noi non sappiamo spiegare il suo dramma: possediamo una teoria generale del male, non una teoria specifica.
continua
Levon
5つ星のうち5.0
Refreshing assessment of the problem of evil
2011年12月26日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
I've heard many responses to this very important issue so to find some originality in this book was definitely refreshing from my perspective.
The good:
-The author did a fantastic job articulating his position and clearly defining his goals
-The author was extremely humble in his approach and did not make unreasonable claims (e.g., no claims inconsistent with mainstream science). This made him seem very sensible.
-The core of his rebuttal on what he calls the "global argument from evil" was presented in a story format which was easy to understand. He then followed with answers to possible objections which were exactly what you yourself, as the reader, may have been thinking.
Overall, Peter van Inwagen does a great job of offering an explanation for the evil we see in the world. It's not perfect but it just may be good enough.
The bad:
-The book isn't quite as long as it could have been, especially considering that more objections could be posed and refuted as the main rebuttals to the various versions of the argument from evil were complex enough to warrant further discussion. Basically, he could have spent more time strengthening his arguments.
-The actual problem of evil doesn't begin to be addressed until chapter 4.
-His answer to divine hiddenness is lacking in comparison to the quality of his other answers. Really it's too short and leaves too many questions in your head. He says that God doesn't care as much about belief in him, and more about a change of heart and a relationship. He says if God performed miracles to make people believe in him they would, despite being convinced of his existence, still refuse to essentially be good people or improve their moral state...I think the idea has some potential, that God is not solely interested in mere belief in his existence, but why think that people wouldn't change if they saw miracles being performed? Some may, some may not, but it's ridiculous to assume that no one would change their moral state or come to a relationship with God if God performed a miracle and proved to them he exists.
Again, this is overall a fantastic book and though could have been better, definitely interesting and worth the read. That's why it gets five stars.
The good:
-The author did a fantastic job articulating his position and clearly defining his goals
-The author was extremely humble in his approach and did not make unreasonable claims (e.g., no claims inconsistent with mainstream science). This made him seem very sensible.
-The core of his rebuttal on what he calls the "global argument from evil" was presented in a story format which was easy to understand. He then followed with answers to possible objections which were exactly what you yourself, as the reader, may have been thinking.
Overall, Peter van Inwagen does a great job of offering an explanation for the evil we see in the world. It's not perfect but it just may be good enough.
The bad:
-The book isn't quite as long as it could have been, especially considering that more objections could be posed and refuted as the main rebuttals to the various versions of the argument from evil were complex enough to warrant further discussion. Basically, he could have spent more time strengthening his arguments.
-The actual problem of evil doesn't begin to be addressed until chapter 4.
-His answer to divine hiddenness is lacking in comparison to the quality of his other answers. Really it's too short and leaves too many questions in your head. He says that God doesn't care as much about belief in him, and more about a change of heart and a relationship. He says if God performed miracles to make people believe in him they would, despite being convinced of his existence, still refuse to essentially be good people or improve their moral state...I think the idea has some potential, that God is not solely interested in mere belief in his existence, but why think that people wouldn't change if they saw miracles being performed? Some may, some may not, but it's ridiculous to assume that no one would change their moral state or come to a relationship with God if God performed a miracle and proved to them he exists.
Again, this is overall a fantastic book and though could have been better, definitely interesting and worth the read. That's why it gets five stars.
owlgirl
5つ星のうち5.0
Worth getting
2020年7月23日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
So good, love this guy. Only thing I would quibble on is I suspect most people who've thought about the issue a lot will not find his theodicy of animal suffering particularly compelling, and his defense has been dissected quite a bit by others who have written on the subject. Still, the nomic regularity defensive he offers is a useful aspect of the response to the problem of animal suffering, so the chapter is still not a total loss or anything. But that subject is really a book on its own, so I would suggest something like Doughtery's or perhaps Schneider's work for a more fulsome defense of animal suffering, etc..
Ronald
5つ星のうち5.0
A new analysis of the problem of evil
2013年3月30日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済みAmazonで購入
This is among the most stimulating books on the problem evil that I have run across. The author writes clearly about a problem that has been covered in numerous ways and still manages to have something new to say in regard to the problem. His thesis that philosophical arguments don't convince anyone is certainly interesting and highly controversial. This is one philosophical work that I could hardly put down. Not a difficult read but it requires a certain amount of thought and concentration as does any work dealing with the problem of evil. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in philosophy and the problem of evil