中古品:
￥2,600 税込
配送料 ¥275 5月29日 水曜日にお届け（12 時間 39 分以内にご注文の場合）
詳細を見る
中古商品: 良い | 詳細
発売元 （株）東亜ブック（１９６６年創業）
コンディション: 中古商品: 良い
コメント: 保管時の汚れ、擦れ、表紙に多少のキズがあります。未読品です。原則当社営業日（土・日、祝祭日を除く平日）午後3時までのご注文は東京都より当日発送致します。品切れの際は速やかにご注文をキャンセルさせて頂きます。
Kindleアプリのロゴ画像

無料のKindleアプリをダウンロードして、スマートフォン、タブレット、またはコンピューターで今すぐKindle本を読むことができます。Kindleデバイスは必要ありません。

ウェブ版Kindleなら、お使いのブラウザですぐにお読みいただけます。

携帯電話のカメラを使用する - 以下のコードをスキャンし、Kindleアプリをダウンロードしてください。

KindleアプリをダウンロードするためのQRコード

著者をフォロー

Elinor Ostrom
+ フォロー
この著者の他の本
何か問題が発生しました。後で再度リクエストしてください。

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) ペーパーバック – 1990/11/30

英語版 Elinor Ostrom (著)
4.7 5つ星のうち4.7 271個の評価
すべての形式と版を表示

この商品には新版があります:

Governing the Commons
Governing the Commons
￥3,276
(271)
在庫あり。
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
続きを読む もっと少なく読む
Previous page
  1. 本の長さ
    298ページ
  2. 言語
    英語
  3. 出版社
    Cambridge University Press
  4. 発売日
    1990/11/30
  5. 寸法
    15.24 x 1.91 x 22.86 cm
  6. ISBN-10
    0521405998
  7. ISBN-13
    978-1933771779
  8. すべての詳細を表示
Next page

商品の説明

レビュー

"In this ambitious, provocative, and very useful book Ostrom combines a lucid theoretical framework with a series of diverse and richly detailed case studies...she tightly reviews and critiques extant models of cooperation and collective action and argues powerfully that communities of actors are sometimes able to maintain a common resource for long periods of time without outside intervention." Contemporary Sociology

"Ostrom's book is an important contribution to the problems of Commom Property Resources that is, the lack of well-defined property rights over a certain resource. Elinor Ostrom convincingly shows that there are many different viable mixtures between public and private, in particular self-organization and self-governance by the users of the common property resource. The book makes fascinating reading, particularly as it is well written." Bruno S. Frey, Kyklos

"This is an important book that deserves to be read widely in the policy community as well as the scholarly community....this analysis leaves us with provocative questions whose examination promises to broaden and deepen our understanding of human/environment relationships at many levels." Oran R. Young, International Environmental Affairs

"Cambridge University Press has published an impressive series called 'The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions.' Elinor Ostrom, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, has made an important contribution to the series with Governing the Commons....In large part, the book is a fascinating and detailed examination of common ownership of various natural resources." Dean Lueck, Constitutional Political Economy

"Students of common-property resource regimes will find much of great interest in the volume." Barry C. Field, Land Economics

"...timely, well-written, and a useful addition to our understanding of the challenges of natural resource management....useful for undergraduate and graduate students as well as field practitioners interested in the development of scientifically based research. It provides a firm grounding in the theoretical underpinnings that should guide empirical investigations....Ostrom offers a unique source of information on the realities of resource management institutions coupled with the challenge for continued examination of institutions in order to develop better ways to address the CPR challenge." Gordon L. Brady, Southern Economic Journal

"Ostrom's book makes an important contribution to the emerging literature on analytical institutional economics. Her work reminds us that analysis of institutions and institutional change is an important aspect of a broader political economy that underlies meaningful economic policy advice." Daniel W. Bromley, Journal of Economic Literature

"This is the most influential book in the last decade on thinking about the commons. For those involved with small communities...located in one nation, whose lives depend on a common pool of renewable resources....Governing the Commons has been the intellectual field guide." Whole Earth

"A classic by one of the best-known thinkers on communities and commons." Yes! A Journal of Positive Futures

登録情報

  • 出版社 ‏ : ‎ Cambridge University Press (1990/11/30)
  • 発売日 ‏ : ‎ 1990/11/30
  • 言語 ‏ : ‎ 英語
  • ペーパーバック ‏ : ‎ 298ページ
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0521405998
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1933771779
  • 寸法 ‏ : ‎ 15.24 x 1.91 x 22.86 cm
  • カスタマーレビュー:
    4.7 5つ星のうち4.7 271個の評価

著者について

著者をフォローして、新作のアップデートや改善されたおすすめを入手してください。
Elinor Ostrom

Elinor Ostrom

Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.
Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

著者の本をもっと発見したり、よく似た著者を見つけたり、著者のブログを読んだりしましょう

カスタマーレビュー

星5つ中4.7つ
5つのうち4.7つ
271グローバルレーティング

この商品をレビュー

他のお客様にも意見を伝えましょう
カスタマーレビューを書く

上位レビュー、対象国： 日本

yasuji
5つ星のうち5.0 2009年ノーベル賞
2022年3月9日に日本でレビュー済み
ある共有の牧草地に複数の農民が家畜を放牧している。農民は牧草地から最大の利益を得るためにより多くの家畜を放牧する。すると他の農民もこのままだと自分の取り分が減ってしまうので家畜を増やして取り分が確保しようとする。かくして家畜を無尽蔵に増やすことになり、牧草地は草が一本も生えず荒廃する。
　生態学者ハーディン(a)はこれを「共有地の悲劇」と名付けた。そして共有地の悲劇は、限られた資源を利用する環境破壊のシンボルとなった。彼は次のように結論する。「制限のある世界にあるにもかかわらず、無制限に家畜の群れを増やすよう強制されるシステムに人びとは組み込まれている。すべての人々は荒廃に向かう運命にある。人々は共有の自由があると信じて、各自の最高の利益を追求しているのだ。」と。
　この悲劇の解決のために経済学者オストロームは本書で、政府による統治でもなく、自由市場（私有化）に任せるのでもない、集団行動を導くための制度作りを提唱した。これは悲劇といわれるにもかかわらず成功した例、失敗した例を収集し考察した結果である。

【コミュニティーに自治をもたらす原則】
１．集団の境界が明確に決められている（Group boundaries are clearly defined.）
２．集団を統治するルールはローカルな状況とマッチしている（Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions.）
３．このルールに影響されるほとんどの人がルールの調整に参加できる（Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.）
４．コミュニティー・メンバーが自ら工夫するルールは外部の権威から尊重される（The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities.
５．コミュニティーのメンバー自身が行う、メンバーの行動をモニターするシステムが存在する（A system for monitoring member's behavior exists; the community members themselves undertake this monitoring.）
６．徐々に増加するサンクション・システムが使われる（A graduated system of sanctions is used.）
７．メンバーはローコストな紛争解決の場にアクセスできる（Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.）
８．共同体はさらに大きなシステムの一部として、多層構造の中で組織される（For Common-pool resources that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.）
以上は、(b)Kollock & Smith (1996)の要約である。

(a) Garrett Hardin (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, Vol.162, No.3859, 1243-1248.
(b) Peter Kollock & Marc Smith (1996) Managing the Virtual Commons: Cooperation and Conflict in Computer Communities. In Susan Herring (Ed.) Computer-Mediated Communication. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub Co.
3人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
役に立った
 レポート
risei
5つ星のうち4.0 コミュニティの可能性
2012年1月6日に日本でレビュー済み
2009年にノーベル賞を受けたIndia UniversityのElinor Ostrom教授の代表作で、コモンズ(CPR: Common-Pool Resources)の統治分析の枠組み(framework)を実証的アプローチで提示しています。政府による規制でもなく私的所有権・市場原理に基づく民営化でもない、コミュニティによる自治でのコモンズ統治の可能性と成功のためのポイントを、異なる背景、様々な要素が入り乱れる過去の事例から抽出していきます。膨大な調査の成果物であるコモンズ統治分析の枠組みは貴重な研究成果だと感じます。コモンズ統治における、中央集権の限界、また資本の論理に囚われる民営化の限界を超える可能性を秘めた自治集団の役割に焦点をあてた研究ですが、東日本大震災の復興が遅々として進まない状況の中で本書を読むと、日本の中央集権的な政治の仕組みが地域レベルでの自治を機能不全に陥れていること、相続によって地権者を増やし、減反で農家の兼業化を進めた日本の過去の政策が、地域コミュニティにとって有機的に組織だった仕組みを形成する障害になっているのも見えてきます。農林水産省が推進する集落毎の会社組織による営利農業も一案でしょうが、地域コミュニティ、地域自治集団復活のためにも、道州制、地方分権が行政改革と共に早く進むと良いのですが。。。時間の無い方は、まず前書き部分(Preface)の動機と第6章の結論を。なぜその枠組みが機能するのか納得したければ、第1章の方法論、第2章以下の実証例に進むことをお勧めします。
18人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
役に立った
 レポート

他の国からのトップレビュー

すべてのレビューを日本語に翻訳
Mert
5つ星のうち5.0 Excellent Read (from someone who was forced to read it)
2022年11月9日にカナダでレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Extremely insightful and real life case studies covered by Ostrom in this book. I was forced to read this in an upper-year Public Policy Economics course at University, and it is what I would consider to be my favourite read out of all four of my years studying.

Excellent read by and excellent author.
レポート
Cliente Amazon
5つ星のうち5.0 Serviço perfeito!
2022年6月1日にブラジルでレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Serviço perfeito! Produto dispensa apresentações.
レポート
Shubham Chowdhury
5つ星のうち3.0 Photocopied version
2020年9月3日にインドでレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Received a photocopied / pirated version (quite clear from the low quality paper and tilted print). Did not return it because the information was there, but WAY too overpriced for a shoddy reproduction.
2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
 レポート
DSS
5つ星のうち5.0 Imprescindible
2016年1月4日にスペインでレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Interesantísimo. Excelente mezcla de análisis teórico y práctico. Una mirada diferente sobre una cuestión mucho más relevante de lo que pueda parecer a primera vista. Un clásico que merece serlo
レポート
Athan
5つ星のうち5.0 Superb
2014年10月29日に英国でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel for her work on common-pool resources, so this book represents Economics orthodoxy on the topic.

It does not disappoint.

Presumably to get us interested, the author starts backwards, taking us through three examples of simple theories that predict common-pool resources will always perish: the "prisoner's dilemma," the "tragedy of the commons" and the "logic of collective action."

From there she goes on to explain how a common-pool resource differs from a public good like national defence or public safety: First, if my cow is grazing on a meadow, it's eating grass that won't be there for your cow to eat. Second, by dint of competing with one another to extract fish from a lake, we could be doing so at the expense of our future ability to fish from the lake. National defence, on the other hand (a public good, rather than a common-pool resource) is there for all of us to fully take advantage of and does not perish through the tragedy of the commons. A common-pool resource is thus defined (p.30) as a "stock" of variables that can produce a maximum quantity of "flow" variable without harming the "stock" or the system, with the added complications that 1. it could be costly to monitor / police / limit the "appropriation" of the "flow" 2. it could be costly to ensure the continued "provision" of this common-pool resource itself (for example, a community might need to keep a dam in good shape)

Next, the author politely points out that the three game-theoretical constructs which predict the demise of all common-poor resources are far too abstract and proceeds to disprove them by counterexample, listing a number of thriving examples of common-pool resources that 1. have stood the test of time and 2. are isolated and simple enough for us to examine without having any second thoughts as to whether our analysis is complete: High mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland and Japan, irrigation institutions in Spain and the Philippines are described in great detail, and their common characteristics are summarized as follows:

1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Congruence between local conditions and the rules governing "provision" and "appropriation" of the common-pool resource
3. Collective choice arrangements whereby those who use the common-pool resource have voice in establishing or modifying the rules
4. Monitoring that is, at a minimum, accountable to the appropriators
5. Graduated sanctions for rule-breakers
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. The right of appropriators to organise must not be challenged by outside authorities
8. For larger common-pool resources there is a need for multiple layers of nested enterprises to take care of "provision," "appropriation," "monitoring," "enforcement," "resolution," "government" etc.

It's a formidable list, but it's not exhaustive. In the spirit of Douglass North and Mancur Olson, the author next introduces a further factor in the equation, and that's the contribution that government institutions have to make to common-pool resources by means of providing technological expertise and a helpful legal framework that will jointly act to support, help shape and enforce the decisions of the agents who engage in the provision and appropriation of the common-pool resource. The example here comes from a very thorough examination of how institutional change was made possible in the case of a number of rather diverse groundwater basins in California in the 1950's and 60's.

A long list of failures comes under the microscope next: two Turkish fisheries, yet another Californian groundwater basin, a (totally fascinating) Sri Lankan fishery (p.151), followed by a couple borderline cases in Sri Lanka and Canada. They are all checked against the list, with a summary (p.180) of successes and failures that makes for some very persuasive reading.

Rather than declare some type of "breakthrough," the book closes with an extremely humble assessment of the quandary facing participants in common-pool resources and an attempt to describe a general framework for assessing the potential for success through their eyes: the size, variability, quality and longevity of the benefits that will flow to the potential appropriators must be weighed against the costs inherent in helping out with "provision," the transformation costs, the monitoring and enforcement costs, the information costs and the potential for positive institutional change. The author submits that in her opinion the following factors are most conducive to a positive decision to adopt a new rule / participate in a proposed solution:

1. Looming harm if the rule is not adopted/changed to save the resource
2. Appropriators will be affected in similar ways if a rule is adopted/changed
3. Low discount rates
4. Low information, transformation, monitoring and enforcement costs
5. Pre-existing social capital (e.g.in the form of norms or reciprocity and trust)
6. A relatively small and stable group appropriating from the common-pool resource

I'll be totally honest, I read this entire book with an eye toward analysing the European common currency as a common-pool resource, but in the end I was captivated by the theory itself. Even if I never apply this knowledge to anything, I thoroughly enjoyed reading "Governing the Commons." I was entertained and challenged in equal measure.
7人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
 レポート