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The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve ハードカバー – 2016/1/26
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An in-depth look at the history, leadership, and structure of the Federal Reserve Bank
The independence of the Federal Reserve is considered a cornerstone of its identity, crucial for keeping monetary policy decisions free of electoral politics. But do we really understand what is meant by "Federal Reserve independence"? Using scores of examples from the Fed's rich history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve shows that much common wisdom about the nation's central bank is inaccurate. Legal scholar and financial historian Peter Conti-Brown provides an in-depth look at the Fed's place in government, its internal governance structure, and its relationships to such individuals and groups as the president, Congress, economists, and bankers.
Exploring how the Fed regulates the global economy and handles its own internal politics, and how the law doesand does notdefine the Fed's power, Conti-Brown captures and clarifies the central bank's defining complexities. He examines the foundations of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which established a system of central banks, and the ways that subsequent generations have redefined the organization. Challenging the notion that the Fed Chair controls the organization as an all-powerful technocrat, he explains how institutions and individualswithin and outside of governmentshape Fed policy. Conti-Brown demonstrates that the evolving mission of the Fedincluding systemic risk regulation, wider bank supervision, and as a guardian against inflation and deflationrequires a reevaluation of the very way the nation's central bank is structured.
Investigating how the Fed influences and is influenced by ideologies, personalities, law, and history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve offers a clear picture of this uniquely important institution.
- 本の長さ347ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Princeton Univ Pr
- 発売日2016/1/26
- 寸法17.15 x 3.18 x 25.4 cm
- ISBN-100691164002
- ISBN-13978-0691164007
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- 出版社 : Princeton Univ Pr (2016/1/26)
- 発売日 : 2016/1/26
- 言語 : 英語
- ハードカバー : 347ページ
- ISBN-10 : 0691164002
- ISBN-13 : 978-0691164007
- 寸法 : 17.15 x 3.18 x 25.4 cm
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 584,105位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 329位Public Finance
- - 672位Money & Monetary Policy
- - 769位Banks & Banking
- カスタマーレビュー:
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The author makes an important point about the number of ways that the current Fed is not exactly working as originally (or even latterly) contemplated by the drafters of the Federal Reserve Act. I had always wondered, for example, how the Regional Fed Presidents were appointed. The author's answers is simple: unconstitutionally. I'd also wondered how Central Banks had become so fixated on short-term interest rates as their policy rate: the reason has to do with the resolution of an old fight between Washington NY regarding who is really running monetary policy.
The book also has a great bibliography which, for anyone vaguely interested in Fed history, is a goldmine of interesting looking books and articles just by itself.
The author describes the history of the Fed and how it evolved from its formation a century ago where it was a Federalist institution to the centralized power it is now. The author describes how those transitions took place and the main characters who aided that process. The author discusses the history of the Fed to highlight how it got to the powers it has and how today's structure is not how it was initially structured but a combination of circumstance and political mandate changes. The author discusses the uniqueness of the Fed's accountability to the United States president given it is a mixture of publicly inaugurated officials like the Fed Chair and the privately hired members like the various bank presidents. This is argued to be unconstitutional and the author gives the case history which has brought this up in the past. The author goes into the economic philosophies that have driven monetary economists over the years and how the real bills doctrine is an extremely distant memory from today's Fed. The author argues that the fed is much more similar to the Supreme court and should potentially be structured and organized as such rather than the quasi government private institution it is today. It is definitely an interesting overview of the legal cloud which the Fed operates under and for those interested in the legal structure of the Fed this book is a reminder of its existence outside the boundaries of democratic accountability.
I definitely sympathize with the author's direction of the book. The actions taken by the Fed have had political repercussions and as a consequence, the mandate of the Fed and the accountability of the institution has changed from their original intent. Consequently a rethinking of what the degrees of freedom of the Fed should be are in order. Unfortunately this is an extremely complex issue and more democratic accountability of an institution that requires a level of knowledge and expertise that is far removed from the voting body leads to close to an unsolvable balancing act. The basis of ideology in monetary policy exists, bankers at the ECB, the FED, BOJ all have different views on how to solve problems within their mandates. But to see this as similar to the Supreme Court is really something that a lawyer would say and would be unconvincing to pretty much anyone else. The general public can understand judges opinions on ethical issues which makes democratic participation a much more fruitful exercise because value are intrinsic and relatively easy to reflect on. Understanding what a federal reserve bank president thinks about the implications of asset purchases on balancing growth and income inequality, though interesting to .1% of the population, is not an issue that lends itself to democratic accountability nor general popular debate about the truth of that statement. Despite the greater paternalism required for the "election" of central banking expertise vs Supreme Court justices say, there is a democratic deficit in what has occurred during and post the financial crisis with the Fed. Value judgments were made and there is no accountability of those making them and we have to ask ourselves, does that need changing and if so how. To imagine that the value systems that drive central bankers should be under the spotlight as are those of our justices is a massive overestimation of the general public's ability to have a meaningful opinion on such topics.