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Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton Economic History of the Western World) ペーパーバック – 2015/8/4
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Why stable banking systems are so rare
Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households.
Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues.
Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.
- 本の長さ570ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Princeton Univ Pr
- 発売日2015/8/4
- 寸法13.97 x 3.81 x 21.59 cm
- ISBN-109780691168357
- ISBN-13978-0691168357
商品の説明
レビュー
"Fragile by Design is a call to action for people to seize the moment to resist crony capitalism."---Jay Weiser, Weekly Standard
"[I]f you want a methodology for drawing conclusions about the genesis of crises and an explanation for the differing experiences among countries, Fragile by the Design is the winner hands-down."---Vern McKinley, Cato Journal
"[T]he methodology is universally applicable and obviously raises questions about the nature of these arrangements in a country like France. . . . [T]his work allows us to understand better why . . . the alleged remedies and reforms, from 'unconventional measures' major central banks to new regulatory structures, no way affect the old paradigms and therefore merely prepare the next crises."---Phillipe Ries, Mediapart
"Brilliant. . . . [I]f you are looking for a rich history of banking over the last couple of centuries and the role played by politics in that evolution, there is no better study. It deserves to become a classic."---Liaquat Ahamed, New York Times Book Review
"Business economists Calomiris and Haber explain how imperfectly politics and commercial banks intersect, and the consequences for the rest of us. . . . This learned inquiry deserves ample attention from scholars, regulators, and bankers themselves."-- "Publishers Weekly"
"By any yardstick, Fragile by Design is a remarkable achievement and an important contribution to our understanding of the roots of the banking crises."---Grant Bishop & Anita Anand, Banking & Finance Law Review
"Calomiris and Haber offer a thoughtful counter-argument to the current received wisdom."---Howard Davies, Times Higher Education
"Capital markets, regulatory institutions and the behaviour of people employed in the financial sector are neither predetermined nor universal, but rather the product of culture, history, and the political system. That is a perspective developed effectively by Profs Calomiris and Haber."---John Kay, Financial Times
"Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber make the compelling argument that a country's propensity for frequent banking crises is linked to the ability of populist elements to hold the banking sector to ransom."---Louise Bennetts, American Banker
"Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber's Fragile by Design is a magnificent study of the economics and politics of banking."---Mervyn King, Bloomberg Businessweek
"Exploring the ways in which politics inevitably intrude into banking regulation, Calomiris and Haber clearly describe events leading to the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009. . . . This is an excellent work for understanding the role of credit and how the financial sector evolved in different settings."-- "Choice"
"Hands down the best single book for understanding the historical journey that laid the groundwork for the financial crisis."---Jeffrey Lacker, Bloomberg Businessweek
"If you have time to read only one book about the causes of the 2008 financial collapse, read this one. . . . Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber . . . have written an exhaustively researched and readable volume. . . . With great literary sensibility uncommon to economists, Calomiris and Haber have performed a public service by painstakingly identifying these root causes."---Diana Furchtgott-Roth, National Review
"Longlisted for the Financial Times and McKinsey Business Book of the Year 2014"
"One cannot help but admire Calomiris and Haber's ambition to write one of the most accessible and sophisticated books on the linkage between political institutions and national financial systems."---Caner Bakir, Public Administration
"One of Bloomberg Businessweek's Best Books of 2014, chosen by Mervyn King and Jeffrey M. Lacker"
"One of Financial Times (FT.com) Best Economics Books of 2014, chosen by Martin Wolf"
"One of The Times Higher Education Supplement's Books of the Year 2014, selected by Sir Howard Davies"
"One reason why economists did not see the financial crisis coming is that the models most macro and financial economists deal in are free of politics. Fragile by Design offers a much-needed supplement."---Martin Sandbu, Financial Times
"Readable, erudite, myth-busting. . . . The authors' clear and well-documented discussion of what happened should dissuade anyone of the myth that the economic crisis of 2007-09 was caused by the profit-and-loss system of unfettered capitalism."---Gene Epstein, Barron's
"This is a beautifully-written book. Calomiris and Haber are always thoughtful, always clear, and they have an eye for the telling metaphor and the thought provoking fact. More importantly, the book reflects the authors' mastery of a vast amount of material on the history of banking. . . . Fragile by Design is a must-read for economic historians, a book to be put on the shelf with . . . similar classics."---Hugh Rockoff, EH.Net
"This is a great history of political interference in bank regulation."---James Ferguson, Money Week
"Will a next crisis be averted? Perhaps, if our regulators read this book."---Vicky Pryce, The Independent
"Winner of the 2015 PROSE Award in Business, Finance & Management, Association of American Publishers"
著者について
登録情報
- ASIN : 0691168350
- 出版社 : Princeton Univ Pr; Reprint版 (2015/8/4)
- 発売日 : 2015/8/4
- 言語 : 英語
- ペーパーバック : 570ページ
- ISBN-10 : 9780691168357
- ISBN-13 : 978-0691168357
- 寸法 : 13.97 x 3.81 x 21.59 cm
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 392,322位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 135位Comparative Economics
- - 513位Banks & Banking
- - 694位Macroeconomics
- カスタマーレビュー:
著者について
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他の国からのトップレビュー
The authors posit that financial fragility is a function of a rentsharing bargaining process between stakeholders including, but not limited to, governments and bank insiders. This introduces an interesting dimension of governmental / political moral hazard as it is governments who regulate banks but at the same time are their largest creditors.
The book Takes tge form of a tgeoretical framework (which is a littke heavy going, but prrsevere) a comparative / historical study of banking in the UK, USA, Canada, Mexico and Brazil before cincluding with implications for policy.
this truly is a refreshing approach to analyzinh bank crises and absolute worth a read.
Se qualcuno di fronte alla crisi si è chiesto come mai nessuno se ne sia reso conto prima, legga questo libro!
In many cases, going back to the creation of the Bank of England in 1694, the banking system has been devised to facilitate the war-fighting aims of the sovereign. The same is shown to be true of the Union in the Civil War. And of course, once the political elite tasks the banking system to serve as its aide or partner, they inevitably winds up having to support the partner in times of trouble, a symbiotic dynamic that is often demonstrated throughout the book. Meanwhile, in another recurring theme, populist agendas often determine the conditions on which lending is done outside of wartime. The book contains brilliant, concise narratives of how a populist-agrarian coalition shaped the US banking sector throughout the 19th and early 20th century -- briefly summarized, farmers wanted local banks that had no alternative but to be responsive to them in lean years, but, as the nation grew more urban, that political coalition waned, and branch banking and banking consolidation followed. But, as the authors show, a different coalition, originating with affordable housing activists and urban Democratic Party operatives empowered by the Community Reinvestment Act, arose in its place to extract their own tolls or rents from banks seeking to merge, and eventually from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well (because only government-backed entities could absorb the credit risk flooding the system as a result). And thus the policies that led to the financial crisis of 2008 were put in place by the political process.
The authors' phrase for this symbiotic dynamic between the banking sector and the government of a nation is "the Game of Bank Bargains": politicians want banks to make credit available freely to the fisc and to targeted constituencies, who vary from era to era and nation to nation, and banking executives can indeed be persuaded to play along, as long as they get what they want for themselves, which has generally entailed some measure of shifting the resulting credit risk back to the state. They explore its various permutations thoroughly, in more eras and more cultures than I had anticipated. The contrast they draw between the recurrent instability of America's "unit banking" system with Canada's relatively safer and sounder banking system was particularly eye-opening. And the chapter on Mexico, written I suspect by Haber, who has published a lot on Mexican banking, was absolutely dazzling.
Overall, this was a stunningly good book and I hope it will be widely read as I think it really puts not just the financial crisis but the entire history of banking in an enlightening perspective.