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The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change ハードカバー – 2013/10/14
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In The Road to Recovery, Andrew Smithers―one of a handful of respected economists to have accurately predicted the most recent global financial crisis―argues that the neoclassical consensus governing global economic decision-making must be revised in order to avoid the next financial collapse. He argues that the current low interest rates and budget deficits have prevented the recession becoming a depression but that those policies cannot be continuously repeated and a new consensus for action must be found. He offers practical guidance on reducing government, household, and business debt; changing the economic incentives for the management class that currently inhibit long-term growth; and rebalancing national economies both internally and externally. Further, he explains how central bankers must broaden the economic theories that guide their decisions to include the major factors of debt and asset prices.
- Offers practical, real-world economic policies for restructuring and rebalancing the global economic system
- Presents a modern economic theory for preventing the next collapse
- Ideal for economists, investors, fund managers, and central bankers
- Written by an economist described by the legendary Barton Biggs as "one of the five best, most dispassionate, erudite analysts in the world"
As the global economy continues the long climb out of recession, it's imperative that central bankers and other economic decision-makers not repeat the mistakes of the past. The Road to Recovery offers prescriptive guidance on redesigning an economic system that is healthy, stable, and beneficial to all.
- 本の長さ360ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Wiley
- 発売日2013/10/14
- 寸法16 x 2.54 x 23.37 cm
- ISBN-109781118515662
- ISBN-13978-1118515662
商品の説明
レビュー
著者について
Andrew Smithers is Chairman of Smithers & Co. Ltd. and is a leading expert on financial economics and global asset allocation. His forty-five years’ experience in international investment includes twenty-five years at SG Warburg & Co where, amongst other roles, he ran the investment management division, and over twenty years as head of his own investment consultancy firm, Smithers & Co, based in London. He is the co-author of three books on international finance: Valuing Wall Street, co-written with Stephen Wright, published in 2000; and Japan’s Key Challenges for the 21st Century, co-written with David Asher, published in 1999. His book Wall Street Revalued - Imperfect Markets and Inept Central Bankers was published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in July, 2009. He is also the author of Chapter 6, “Can We Identify Bubbles and Stabilize the System?” in The Future of Finance: The LSE Report, published by The London School of Economics and Political Science in September, 2010. Andrew is a Trustee of the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, a Fellow of CFA (UK) and member of the Advisory Board for the Centre for International Macroeconomics and Finance (CIMF) at Cambridge University.
As head of Smithers & Co., Andrew has helped pioneer the application of academic analysis of financial economics to investment management. He is well known for his work on valuing markets, including application of ‘q’, for his pioneering studies on the distorting impact of employee stock options on US profits, and for work on showing the understatement of Japanese published profits compared with US ones.
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This is a book that warrants a second, and perhaps a third, reading.
Excellent.
Peter

My favorite book of 2013, Stockman's "Great Deformation," argues that the financial crisis was caused by the lethal combination of three factors that in isolation could have been benign: (i) the tax advantage of debt financing over equity financing (ii) the tax advantage of income from capital gains over income from labor and (iii) the Fed's perception of its role as that of a guarantor of prosperity leading to permanently loose monetary policy. These factors, Stockman argues, combined to fuel 1. Corporate Equity Withdrawal in all its forms, from the Tyco, Enron and (dare I say it) GE and Cisco-style acquisition, creative accounting and profit management cultures that centered around the worship of the stock price, to the Private Equity bubble that has left North America with (just for example) 5% of the world's population but 42% of the world's hotel rooms (you can borrow against a hotel room) and tons of healthy companies disemboweled at the altar of current shareholders' short-sighted, narrow interests and 2. The Private Equity Withdrawal fest that was the 2000-2008 GSE / mortgage broker / subprime / Wall Street CDO housing bubble.
Andrew Smithers takes this much further. He asserts that the incentives which fuel Corporate Equity Withdrawal not only caused the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008 (all major recessions are started by falls in asset prices, he argues), but also stand in the way of recovery. Here's a set of rhetorical questions to summarize his argument:
1. Is everyone surprised at how profitable UK and US corporates are at the moment?
2. Is everyone surprised at how low corporate investment is right now in the US and the UK?
3. Is everyone, including the BoE and the Fed, surprised at how quickly unemployment numbers are improving in the US and the UK? Is everyone dismayed about how little these fresh new jobs are paying?
4. Was 2013 the new record year for corporate issuance following another record year in 2012?
5. Is inequality of income the topic on everyone's lips today?
Additionally (and this has less to do with the Macro picture, but it corroborates the whole argument) has anybody noticed that corporate earnings are massively more volatile than both their past volatility and their volatility in GDP accounts?
What if there is a single process/mechanism that powers all of the above? What if CEOs across the UK and the US were currently:
1. Refusing to lower their profit margins in the interest of temporarily sending up the stock price (and losing market share in the long run)
2. Refusing to invest in plant and equipment and R&D in the interest of temporarily sending up the stock price (and staying behind in developments in the long run) via higher short-term earnings?
3. Making up for the lack of investment by hiring cheap labor to fill in the gaps?
4. Issuing tons of debt, only to turn around and use the proceeds to buy back stock?
5. Taking huge writedowns as soon as they land a new job (like loan-book writedowns after the financial crisis, legal provisions after oil spills etc.) which they claw back slowly and goose up earnings with during their tenure at the top?
6. Compensating themselves with options that automatically get driven up in price as record amounts of stock buybacks are squeezing up earnings per share via the denominator and have taken the ratio of pay from the shop floor to management higher than 500:1?
Smithers basically addresses the major conundrum of the anaemic post-2008 recovery through a single explanation: CEOs across the UK and the US are only keeping their jobs for five years (rather than ten or fifteen like they used to) so they're doing whatever they can to drive up the share prices that turbo boost the value of the options they are awarding themselves. They are refusing to sacrifice profit margins to gain market share, they are refusing to make investments that won't bear fruit immediately, they make up for inadequate deployed capital by hiring cheap stop-gap labor, they are issuing as many bonds as the market can bear, landing tons of cash on their balance sheet, which then gets used to fuel massive stock buybacks, with the express purpose of sending up their pay pacakges.
As a result, expansionary monetary and fiscal policy has very little effect. Lower rates don't help with investment, because high rates never were the cause of inadequate corporate investment. Au contraire, low rates make it even cheaper to issue tons of bonds and buy more stock with the proceeds. And government spending is merely making up for the deficit in corporate spending, but at the cost of a continuously mounting government debt, which will at some stage become a source of instability.
I buy it!
This cannot be the only explanation, but it is very significant, because corporate profits are largely concentrated in the S&P 500-sized companies, not in the struggling Small and Medium Enterprises.
While he's at it, Smithers also demolishes two other explanations for the current slump in the UK and the US:
1. Balance sheet recession: Yes, it's what might have happened in Japan (about which more later), but not here, because firms in the UK and the US are not at all shy about borrowing at the moment and neither are households. Corporates are borrowing at record levels, while households' indebtedness has only come down by the amount of housing loan defaults. Everybody else is still borrowing all they can. Nobody feels chastened by the lessons of 2008.
2. Uncertainty: Corporates are refusing to invest not because they don't know what to do with the extra capacity, but because (i) it is more important for them to be able to keep prices and margins higher and (ii) they'd rather use any extra money to buy back more stock. Uncertainty is actually a good thing for corporate CEOs, it increases the volatility of the stock market and the value of their options...
A rival theory Andrew Smithers actually endorses is that since the crisis (which took out scores of competitors across many industries) the corporate landscape has become a lot less competitive. On the scale from perfect competition to oligopolistic competition all the way to monopoly, we have moved further away from competition and closer to monopoly. Monopolies, as we know, keep output below the competitive equilibrium output, prices above those at the competitive equilibrium, profit margins higher than their zero value under perfect competition and can act as monopsonists vis a vis their employees.
I actually like that theory even more. But I recognize it does not explain the current proliferation of crappy low-paying jobs (the cause of the celebrated "fall in productivity") as well as Smithers' theory.
In practice, both must be happening at the same time!
Having spent a hundred-odd pages on this main idea, the book drifts into stuff that did not captivate me as much.
There's a chapter on Japan which explains (convincingly to somebody like me) that the problem there is the opposite: too much corporate investment caused by overly generous depreciation allowances actually masks solid corporate profitability.
There's a chapter on Inflation that left me wondering if the author was scared of high or low inflation. You surely cannot reasonably fear both equally at the same time.
There's a chapter on the instability caused by the combination of very high government debt, over-inflated asset prices in US Equities, UK real estate and bonds all over the world, central banks that refuse to remove the punchbowl etc. but Stephen Roach could have written it (better) in 2004.
There's a singularly confused chapter on how Germany needs to spend more, but the only way to get them to do so is via trashing the JPY, the GBP and I think even the USD, such that German products will become expensive and the Germans will export less/ import more. Maybe it said something different, but it could have been written by Martin Wolf in the FT. He did write the forward to this book, after all. (I say that as a negative, I still don't understand how he's allowed to get the very same article through the editor of the FT every month without anybody saying "enough")
And then come the conclusions, which actually enraged me. It strikes me that if the problem is CEO shortsightedness, then those companies that have myopic CEOs, no matter how important, will be outcompeted by companies that don't treat their stakeholders like idiots. It will take no more than a business cycle. If Andrew Smithers is right about what's stopping the recovery from coming, then this slump will have the same ending as H.G. Wells' "War of the Worlds:" it will die of natural causes.
So I thought that the consistent reaction to the conclusions of the book is to be extremely hopeful. The author clearly does not see it that way and proposes a series of different ways to compensate management. But that's his prerogative, I'm just thankful he wrote this book. Oh, and I really hope nobody tries to do what he suggests, btw. The guy who has a written contract to work toward will always win, let's face it.
And just in case the monopoly explanation is important too, maybe somebody out there should wake up and start enforcing the Sherman Act!
Finally, in case Stockman is right, why not get rid of the corporate income tax and replace it with a tax on all distributions, and set it to the highest marginal income tax rate? But that's an altogether different kettle of fish.
Buy and read "The Road to Recovery" it is a unique book. I took away a message of hope. If he's right about the causes of the persistent slump, it can't be too long till things start going better.


I felt at times that a firmer hand from the book's editor would have been welcome, notably to cut some of the repetition. I'd also have liked more discussion of how policy-makers should go about altering corporate management compensation structures to avoid or at least mitigate the negative consequence for growth that he highlights: it's not obvious that politicians and regulators are any more likely than shareholders to be successful here.
But overall, essential reading for practitioners of the 'stock-broker economics' that Smithers plausibly mocks.

How the Anglo-Saxon bonus culture depresses investment and provokes govt budget deficits.
How the capital asset pricing model -- bedrock of finance depts of business schools -- is flawed.
How reported company profits are distorted and much more volatile than company profits recorded in national income accounts.
Why developed markets' anemic economic recovery may be more structural than cyclical.
Why policymakers were right to let Lehman fail.
How leverage was the tinder and falling asset prices the flame to many financial crises.
Why bank size should be kept in check.
And much more.
The book is full of useful data, not easily found elsewhere. The text is highly readable and in spots very funny.
Andrew combines the practicality of someone who does financial analysis as a living with the rigor of top academic.
I highly recommend The Road to Recovery.
John B. Chambers