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The Return of History and the End of Dreams ペーパーバック – 2009/3/1
Hopes for a new peaceful international order after the end of the Cold War have been dashed by sobering realities. International competition between the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, and Iran raises new threats of regional conflict. The expectation that after the Cold War the world had entered an era of international convergence has proved wrong. We have entered an age of divergence.
In The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Robert Kagan masterfully poses the questions facing the democratic world today. For the past few years, it has been internally divided and distracted by issues both profound and petty. But now History has returned, and the peoples of the liberal world need to choose whether they want to shape it - or let others shape it for them.
- 本の長さ128ページ
- 言語英語
- 出版社Atlantic Books
- 発売日2009/3/1
- 寸法13 x 1 x 20 cm
- ISBN-101843548127
- ISBN-13978-1843548126
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- 出版社 : Atlantic Books; Main版 (2009/3/1)
- 発売日 : 2009/3/1
- 言語 : 英語
- ペーパーバック : 128ページ
- ISBN-10 : 1843548127
- ISBN-13 : 978-1843548126
- 寸法 : 13 x 1 x 20 cm
- カスタマーレビュー:
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In brief, Kagan presents the logical facts about why international turmoil will continue unabated. Yet, he's still stuck in the idealism of Kant and Montesquieu who argued, "The natural effect of commerce is to lead toward peace."
But, commerce is competition which becomes riddled with cheating and bullying. From steroids in sports to bribes in business, competition leads to cheating which leads to fisticuffs and, when enough people are involved, to war. Kagan astutely recognizes the ills of the last century; he doesn't sumble until he gets to the future.
This may be the most relevant book issued this election year. One of it's central ideas is already part of Sen. John McCain's campaign platform, and an issue for discussion in the Financial Times. Ignore Kagan's sense of reality and Bush's blundering bozos will look like picnickers playing in the park compared to what comes next.
"In a world increasingly divided among democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together," Kagan advises. It's a proposal McCain has voiced with his 'League of Democracies'. Kagan likely originated it; McCain copied, which at least shows he's capable of recognizing good ideas.
Yet, there's another "reality". At this point (May 2008), Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton can't form a 'League of Two Democrats' let alone two democracies. Many Republicans have a similar problem in forming a "league" to elect McCain.
What does it prove? It proves life is challenged more by chaos than by all the clever philosophies from Plato to Kagan, who writes, ". . . they regarded democracy as the rule of the licentious, greedy, and ignorant mob".
They were right. Now it's called chaos. Success is the ability to recognize useful patterns within chaos. The world is not an orderly formula which everyone obeys, like some "Universal Theory" Albert Einstein sought so vainly. It's chaos, confusion, conflict and contusion which the wise learn to analyze and the foolish continue to lament.
Aye, there's the rub. How do you implement perceptive insights and good ideas in a world of chaos?
Kagan goes right up to this point, then hesitates rather than plunge into uncertainty. He's an American idealist, ready to build the 'city on a hill' as the perfect answer, a man governed by reason, inspired by perfection but somewhat above reality.
It is a brilliant essay. It's as current as this year's U.S. elections, as timeless as history itself and as relevant as anything else you may read this year.
But, chaos rules. You'll understand after reading this book.
The brief illusion that this was the case in the early to mid nineties started to unravel first with the Balkans, then with 9/11, and has, since the publication of this book, come full circle with the Russian invasion of Georgia (not per se predicted by the author who wrote before the event, but was put forward as both highly plausible and consequential) and the liberal democracies' complete inaction beyond empty words in response. Like the shot heard around the world at Concorde the Russian invasion of Georgia bears out the thesis of this book, that liberal democracy is challenged by other legitimating forms of government, namely autocracy born anew in Putin's Russia, and reformed anew in post Tiananmen China. Towards these pole stars of autocracy much of the world aligns, including North Korea, Burma, Iran, Syria, Venezuela (oddly never mentioned in the book) and a growing number of Central Asian and African countries. Radical Islam is also on the rise, a complicating and consequential factor which can wreak much devastation if unchecked, but one which the author believes can never legitimate itself as a viable alternative to liberal democracy and autocracy. But, importantly, one which autocracy does not mind seeing tying down democracy.
The import of the author's thesis is that the liberal democracies must band together and continue to take an active role in the struggle for what form of government people find most desirable and beneficial, and therefore most legitimate to their needs. To believe otherwise he seems to suggest, to believe that liberal democracy is where human nature evolves to, would logically be to bear as a corollary a belief that the democracies need not have fought either world war or cold war of the past century, and to believe that we are free from having to defend and promote liberal democracy today is just as foolish.
A good, quick and easy to read treatise. Recommended.
He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.
Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.
Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.
The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.
All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.