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The Return of History and the End of Dreams ペーパーバック – 2009/3/1

4.3 5つ星のうち4.3 56個の評価

Hopes for a new peaceful international order after the end of the Cold War have been dashed by sobering realities. International competition between the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, and Iran raises new threats of regional conflict. The expectation that after the Cold War the world had entered an era of international convergence has proved wrong. We have entered an age of divergence.

In
The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Robert Kagan masterfully poses the questions facing the democratic world today. For the past few years, it has been internally divided and distracted by issues both profound and petty. But now History has returned, and the peoples of the liberal world need to choose whether they want to shape it - or let others shape it for them.

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"'In this important, timely, and superblywritten book, Robert Kagan shows that the "end of history" was an illusion. Today's global challenges pose a stern test for the world's democracies. This book is a wake-up call and should be read by policymakers, politicians, pundits and all who want a guide to the dangerous waters of 21st century geopolitics.' Senator John McCain 'Robert Kagan is the reigning pundit of great power politics.' TLS 'Subtle and deep' Economist 'A book demanding to be read' Independent 'Essential reading' Spectator 'Kagan does big-picture thinking in a way that eludes his British counterparts'. Observer"

著者について

ROBERT KAGAN served in the State Department from 1984 to 1998. He is the author of the international bestseller Paradise & Power and co-editor with William Kristol of Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defence Policy. He is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He lives in Brussels with his wife adn two children. Dangerous Nation was published by Atlantic Books in 2006.

登録情報

  • 出版社 ‏ : ‎ Atlantic Books; Main版 (2009/3/1)
  • 発売日 ‏ : ‎ 2009/3/1
  • 言語 ‏ : ‎ 英語
  • ペーパーバック ‏ : ‎ 128ページ
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1843548127
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1843548126
  • 寸法 ‏ : ‎ 13 x 1 x 20 cm
  • カスタマーレビュー:
    4.3 5つ星のうち4.3 56個の評価

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Helene Masliah-Gilkarov
5つ星のうち5.0 Must read
2023年7月24日にドイツでレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
What a book! For everyone interested in world politics and geopolitics. Top stuff!
j zand
5つ星のうち5.0 Truly the end of dreams
2014年10月17日に英国でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Robert Kagan traces the emergence of new powers such as China and Russia in the new global set up. Written in 2008, he did predict the new challenges that the international community especially the West is facing at the moment. A must read for academics as well as general readers.
Theodore A. Rushton
5つ星のうち5.0 Chaos rules, democracy survives, all the rest cause trouble
2008年5月24日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Brilliant; history has not ended, it is alive and well and in most part ignoring and even rejecting the "exceptionalism" of America and writers such as Fukuyama.

In brief, Kagan presents the logical facts about why international turmoil will continue unabated. Yet, he's still stuck in the idealism of Kant and Montesquieu who argued, "The natural effect of commerce is to lead toward peace."

But, commerce is competition which becomes riddled with cheating and bullying. From steroids in sports to bribes in business, competition leads to cheating which leads to fisticuffs and, when enough people are involved, to war. Kagan astutely recognizes the ills of the last century; he doesn't sumble until he gets to the future.

This may be the most relevant book issued this election year. One of it's central ideas is already part of Sen. John McCain's campaign platform, and an issue for discussion in the Financial Times. Ignore Kagan's sense of reality and Bush's blundering bozos will look like picnickers playing in the park compared to what comes next.

"In a world increasingly divided among democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together," Kagan advises. It's a proposal McCain has voiced with his 'League of Democracies'. Kagan likely originated it; McCain copied, which at least shows he's capable of recognizing good ideas.

Yet, there's another "reality". At this point (May 2008), Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton can't form a 'League of Two Democrats' let alone two democracies. Many Republicans have a similar problem in forming a "league" to elect McCain.

What does it prove? It proves life is challenged more by chaos than by all the clever philosophies from Plato to Kagan, who writes, ". . . they regarded democracy as the rule of the licentious, greedy, and ignorant mob".

They were right. Now it's called chaos. Success is the ability to recognize useful patterns within chaos. The world is not an orderly formula which everyone obeys, like some "Universal Theory" Albert Einstein sought so vainly. It's chaos, confusion, conflict and contusion which the wise learn to analyze and the foolish continue to lament.

Aye, there's the rub. How do you implement perceptive insights and good ideas in a world of chaos?

Kagan goes right up to this point, then hesitates rather than plunge into uncertainty. He's an American idealist, ready to build the 'city on a hill' as the perfect answer, a man governed by reason, inspired by perfection but somewhat above reality.

It is a brilliant essay. It's as current as this year's U.S. elections, as timeless as history itself and as relevant as anything else you may read this year.

But, chaos rules. You'll understand after reading this book.
32人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
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Dianne Roberts
5つ星のうち5.0 Thucydidean Return of Man's Permanent Nature in Global Affairs
2008年12月27日にアメリカ合衆国でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
The Return of History is a concise and clarifying explanation of the state of geopolitics in early 2008 from a very Thucydidean point of view. The author at a point alludes to the ancient Greek concept of thumos, or a spirited connection with kin, not so much as the unifying concept of our time (as Huntington on a larger scale or Ralph Peters on a tribal scale would have it) but as one of the myriad rocks of man's permanent nature on which the ship of pre-ordained international democratic liberalism has foundered since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The main theme of his book is that there is no Marxian march of history towards a single conclusion, no guarantee that liberal democracy as seen in the west in general and as most powerfully crystalized in the US in particular is the ineluctable result of social progression.

The brief illusion that this was the case in the early to mid nineties started to unravel first with the Balkans, then with 9/11, and has, since the publication of this book, come full circle with the Russian invasion of Georgia (not per se predicted by the author who wrote before the event, but was put forward as both highly plausible and consequential) and the liberal democracies' complete inaction beyond empty words in response. Like the shot heard around the world at Concorde the Russian invasion of Georgia bears out the thesis of this book, that liberal democracy is challenged by other legitimating forms of government, namely autocracy born anew in Putin's Russia, and reformed anew in post Tiananmen China. Towards these pole stars of autocracy much of the world aligns, including North Korea, Burma, Iran, Syria, Venezuela (oddly never mentioned in the book) and a growing number of Central Asian and African countries. Radical Islam is also on the rise, a complicating and consequential factor which can wreak much devastation if unchecked, but one which the author believes can never legitimate itself as a viable alternative to liberal democracy and autocracy. But, importantly, one which autocracy does not mind seeing tying down democracy.

The import of the author's thesis is that the liberal democracies must band together and continue to take an active role in the struggle for what form of government people find most desirable and beneficial, and therefore most legitimate to their needs. To believe otherwise he seems to suggest, to believe that liberal democracy is where human nature evolves to, would logically be to bear as a corollary a belief that the democracies need not have fought either world war or cold war of the past century, and to believe that we are free from having to defend and promote liberal democracy today is just as foolish.

A good, quick and easy to read treatise. Recommended.
5人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています
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M. McManus
5つ星のうち4.0 Very good challenge to "clash of civilizations" theory
2008年6月14日に英国でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilizations' theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China.

He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.

Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.

Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.

The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.

All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.
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