武蔵の日記 RSSフィード

2005 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2006 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2007 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2008 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2009 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2010 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
2011 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 11 |
2012 | 03 | 04 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 11 | 12 |
2013 | 01 |

May 17(Sat), 2008


| 22:00 |  良くあれを含むブックマーク  良くあれのブックマークコメント

 id:lionfan さんとはてなブックマークで誰も言及していないので大丈夫だろうと思うのでここに貼り付けておきます。Paul GrahamによるBe Goodの翻訳です。


 Octopartのくだりは個人的に感動的です。Paul Graham、良い奴だよ。本当に。"Mean well"なんかじゃないさ。自分はそう思った。


  • 2008/5/18: Shiroさんのコメントを見て訂正
  • 2008/5/18: 「人々に良いものだと伝える文章」(something telling people to be good)→「人々に良くあれと伝える文章」


April 2008

2008 年 4 月

(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2008 Startup School.)

(このエッセーは2008年のStartup Schoolで行われた講話に基づいている)

About a month after we started Y Combinator we came up with the phrase that became our motto: Make something people want. We've learned a lot since then, but if I were choosing now that's still the one I'd pick.

Y Combinatorを立ち上げてから一ヶ月ぐらいたった後で、モットーとなったフレーズを思いついた: 「人がほしがるものを作れ」。それから多くのことを学んできたけど、もし今モットーを選びなおすとしても、「人がほしがるものを作れ」を選ぶだろう。

Another thing we tell founders is not to worry too much about the business model, at least at first. Not because making money is unimportant, but because it's so much easier than building something great.


A couple weeks ago I realized that if you put those two ideas together, you get something surprising. Make something people want. Don't worry too much about making money. What you've got is a description of a charity.


When you get an unexpected result like this, it could either be a bug or a new discovery. Either businesses aren't supposed to be like charities, and we've proven by reductio ad absurdum that one or both of the principles we began with is false. Or we have a new idea.


I suspect it's the latter, because as soon as this thought occurred to me, a whole bunch of other things fell into place.




For example, Craigslist. It's not a charity, but they run it like one. And they're astoundingly successful. When you scan down the list of most popular web sites, the number of employees at Craigslist looks like a misprint. Their revenues aren't as high as they could be, but most startups would be happy to trade places with them.


In Patrick O'Brian's novels, his captains always try to get upwind of their opponents. If you're upwind, you decide when and if to engage the other ship. Craigslist is effectively upwind of enormous revenues. They'd face some challenges if they wanted to make more, but not the sort you face when you're tacking upwind, trying to force a crappy product on ambivalent users by spending ten times as much on sales as on development. [1]

Patrich O'Brienの小説では、船長たちはみないつも敵船の風上をとろうとする。風上にいれば、敵船を攻撃する時期を選べるし、それどころか攻撃をするかどうかも選べるからだ。craigslistは事実上多くの求職サイトの風上を押さえている。craigslistもより多くの利益を得ようとすれば、いくつかの困難に直面することだろう。しかし風上をとろうとするときのように、開発の十倍の時間を販売促進活動に費やしてひどい製品を曖昧な態度のユーザーに使わせようとするときのような困難ではないんだ。

I'm not saying startups should aim to end up like Craigslist. They're a product of unusual circumstances. But they're a good model for the early phases.


Google looked a lot like a charity in the beginning. They didn't have ads for over a year. At year 1, Google was indistinguishable from a nonprofit. If a nonprofit or government organization had started a project to index the web, Google at year 1 is the limit of what they'd have produced.


Back when I was working on spam filters I thought it would be a good idea to have a web-based email service with good spam filtering. I wasn't thinking of it as a company. I just wanted to keep people from getting spammed. But as I thought more about this project, I realized it would probably have to be a company. It would cost something to run, and it would be a pain to fund with grants and donations.


That was a surprising realization. Companies often claim to be benevolent, but it was surprising to realize there were purely benevolent projects that had to be embodied as companies to work.


I didn't want to start another company, so I didn't do it. But if someone had, they'd probably be quite rich now. There was a window of about two years when spam was increasing rapidly but all the big email services had terrible filters. If someone had launched a new, spam-free mail service, users would have flocked to it.


Notice the pattern here? From either direction we get to the same spot. If you start from successful startups, you find they often behaved like nonprofits. And if you start from ideas for nonprofits, you find they'd often make good startups.



How wide is this territory? Would all good nonprofits be good companies? Possibly not. What makes Google so valuable is that their users have money. If you make people with money love you, you can probably get some of it. But could you also base a successful startup on behaving like a nonprofit to people who don't have money? Could you, for example, grow a successful startup out of curing an unfashionable but deadly disease like malaria?


I'm not sure, but I suspect that if you pushed this idea, you'd be surprised how far it would go. For example, people who apply to Y Combinator don't generally have much money, and yet we can profit by helping them, because with our help they could make money. Maybe the situation is similar with malaria. Maybe an organization that helped lift its weight off a country could benefit from the resulting growth.

私には確信はないけど、この考えを推し進めていけばその考えをかなりいいところまでもっていけることに驚くだろう。例えば、Y Combinatorに申し込んでくる人というのは一般的に言ってあまりお金を持っていないけれど、私たちはそうした人を助けることで利益を得ている。というのも、私たちの援助があることで、そうした人がお金を稼ぐことができるからだ。おそらくマラリアでも状況は似たようなものなんだ。おそらくある国から重荷を下ろすのを手伝う組織というのは、それによって生じる成長から利益を得ることができる。

I'm not proposing this is a serious idea. I don't know anything about malaria. But I've been kicking ideas around long enough to know when I come across a powerful one.


One way to guess how far an idea extends is to ask yourself at what point you'd bet against it. The thought of betting against benevolence is alarming in the same way as saying that something is technically impossible. You're just asking to be made a fool of, because these are such powerful forces. [2]


For example, initially I thought maybe this principle only applied to Internet startups. Obviously it worked for Google, but what about Microsoft? Surely Microsoft isn't benevolent? But when I think back to the beginning, they were. Compared to IBM they were like Robin Hood. When IBM introduced the PC, they thought they were going to make money selling hardware at high prices. But by gaining control of the PC standard, Microsoft opened up the market to any manufacturer. Hardware prices plummeted, and lots of people got to have computers who couldn't otherwise have afforded them. It's the sort of thing you'd expect Google to do.


Microsoft isn't so benevolent now. Now when one thinks of what Microsoft does to users, all the verbs that come to mind begin with F. [3] And yet it doesn't seem to pay. Their stock price has been flat for years. Back when they were Robin Hood, their stock price rose like Google's. Could there be a connection?


You can see how there would be. When you're small, you can't bully customers, so you have to charm them. Whereas when you're big you can maltreat them at will, and you tend to, because it's easier than satisfying them. You grow big by being nice, but you can stay big by being mean.


You get away with it till the underlying conditions change, and then all your victims escape. So "Don't be evil" may be the most valuable thing Paul Buchheit made for Google, because it may turn out to be an elixir of corporate youth. I'm sure they find it constraining, but think how valuable it will be if it saves them from lapsing into the fatal laziness that afflicted Microsoft and IBM.

その場を切り抜けられるのは根本的な状況が変わるまでで、変わってしまえばすべての犠牲者たちが逃げてしまう。だから「邪悪にならない」はPaul BuchheitがGoogleのために作ったものの中でもっとも価値あるものなのかもしれない。なぜなら、会社の若さを保つ万能薬に変わるからだ。「邪悪にならない」という標語を締め付けが強いと感じていると私は確信しているが、それと同時にマイクロソフトIBMを苦しめた致命的な怠惰に陥ることから助けているとすれば、その標語は非常に価値あるものと考えているはずと確信している。

The curious thing is, this elixir is freely available to any other company. Anyone can adopt "Don't be evil." The catch is that people will hold you to it. So I don't think you're going to see record labels or tobacco companies using this discovery.




There's a lot of external evidence that benevolence works. But how does it work? One advantage of investing in a large number of startups is that you get a lot of data about how they work. From what we've seen, being good seems to help startups in three ways: it improves their morale, it makes other people want to help them, and above all, it helps them be decisive.

慈善がうまくいく外的形跡は多い。しかし、どのようにして慈善がうまくいくのか?多数のベンチャー企業投資することの利点の一つは実際にどのように作用しているのかについての多くのデータを手に入れられるということにある。これまで見てきたことから、優良であることはベンチャー企業を三つの方法で助けるように思える: 士気を高め、他の人からの援助を引き出し、そしてこれが一番大事なのだけど、決断力を持たせてくれる。

Morale is tremendously important to a startup -- so important that morale alone is almost enough to determine success. Startups are often described as emotional roller-coasters. One minute you're going to take over the world, and the next you're doomed. The problem with feeling you're doomed is not just that it makes you unhappy, but that it makes you stop working. So the downhills of the roller-coaster are more of a self fulfilling prophecy than the uphills. If feeling you're going to succeed makes you work harder, that probably improves your chances of succeeding, but if feeling you're going to fail makes you stop working, that practically guarantees you'll fail.


Here's where benevolence comes in. If you feel you're really helping people, you'll keep working even when it seems like your startup is doomed. Most of us have some amount of natural benevolence. The mere fact that someone needs you makes you want to help them. So if you start the kind of startup where users come back each day, you've basically built yourself a giant tamagotchi. You've made something you need to take care of.


Blogger is a famous example of a startup that went through really low lows and survived. At one point they ran out of money and everyone left. Evan Williams came in to work the next day, and there was no one but him. What kept him going? Partly that users needed him. He was hosting thousands of people's blogs. He couldn't just let the site die.

Bloggerは本当に最悪の状況を経験し生き残ったベンチャー企業の有名な例だ。ある時点で資金が尽きEvan Williams以外のすべての人が去った。彼は変わらずに次の日もやってきて働いたが、従業員は彼以外の誰もいなかった。なにが彼を突き動かしたのか?動機の一部はユーザーが彼を必要としていたと言うことだ。彼は数千ものブログホスティングしていた。彼にはBloggerを見殺しにすることはできなかったんだ。

There are many advantages of launching quickly, but the most important may be that once you have users, the tamagotchi effect kicks in. Once you have users to take care of, you're forced to figure out what will make them happy, and that's actually very valuable information.


The added confidence that comes from trying to help people can also help you with investors. One of the founders of Chatterous told me recently that he and his cofounder had decided that this service was something the world needed, so they were going to keep working on it no matter what, even if they had to move back to Canada and live in their parents' basements.


Once they realized this, they stopped caring so much what investors thought about them. They still met with them, but they weren't going to die if they didn't get their money. And you know what? The investors got a lot more interested. They could sense that the Chatterouses were going to do this startup with or without them.


If you're really committed and your startup is cheap to run, you become very hard to kill. And practically all startups, even the most successful, come close to death at some point. So if doing good for people gives you a sense of mission that makes you harder to kill, that alone more than compensates for whatever you lose by not choosing a more selfish project.




Another advantage of being good is that it makes other people want to help you. This too seems to be an inborn trait in humans.


One of the startups we've funded, Octopart, is currently locked in a classic battle of good versus evil. They're a search site for industrial components. A lot of people need to search for components, and before Octopart there was no good way to do it. That, it turned out, was no coincidence.


Octopart built the right way to search for components. Users like it and they've been growing rapidly. And yet for most of Octopart's life, the biggest distributor, Digi-Key, has been trying to force them take their prices off the site. Octopart is sending them customers for free, and yet Digi-Key is trying to make that traffic stop. Why? Because their current business model depends on overcharging people who have incomplete information about prices. They don't want search to work.


The Octoparts are the nicest guys in the world. They dropped out of the PhD program in physics at Berkeley to do this. They just wanted to fix a problem they encountered in their research. Imagine how much time you could save the world's engineers if they could do searches online. So when I hear that a big, evil company is trying to stop them in order to keep search broken, it makes me really want to help them. It makes me spend more time on the Octoparts than I do with most of the other startups we've funded. It just made me spend several minutes telling you how great they are. Why? Because they're good guys and they're trying to help the world.


If you're benevolent, people will rally around you: investors, customers, other companies, and potential employees. In the long term the most important may be the potential employees. I think everyone knows now that good hackers are much better than mediocre ones. If you can attract the best hackers to work for you, as Google has, you have a big advantage. And the very best hackers tend to be idealistic. They're not desperate for a job. They can work wherever they want. So most want to work on things that will make the world better.

もし善意があれば、人々は周りに集まってくる: 投資家、顧客、他の会社、そして潜在的な社員。最終的に一番重要なのはこれから社員になってくれそうな人なのかもしれない。みんないいハッカーは凡庸なハッカーよりも遙かに良いと知っていると思う。もしGoogleがこれまでやってきているように一番のハッカーを自分たちのために引きつけることができれば、大きな優位を得ることになる。そして最高のハッカー理想主義だ。彼らは仕事を必死に探す必要はない。彼らは自分が望む場所で働くことができる。だから、ほとんどのハッカーは世界を良くするプロジェクトに取りかかりたがっているんだ。



But the most important advantage of being good is that it acts as a compass. One of the hardest parts of doing a startup is that you have so many choices. There are just two or three of you, and a thousand things you could do. How do you decide?


Here's the answer: Do whatever's best for your users. You can hold onto this like a rope in a hurricane, and it will save you if anything can. Follow it and it will take you through everything you need to do.

これが答えだ: 自分たちのユーザーにとって最善のことをすればいい。これをハリケーンが猛威をふるっているさなかのロープのように必死に握ることができれば、その信念が助けてくれるだろう。この答えに従えば、やる必要のあることを全部教えてくれる。

It's even the answer to questions that seem unrelated, like how to convince investors to give you money. If you're a good salesman, you could try to just talk them into it. But the more reliable route is to convince them through your users: if you make something users love enough to tell their friends, you grow exponentially, and that will convince any investor.

これは関係のないように見える問いに対する答えにもなっている。例えば投資家を説得して資金を手に入れるというような。もしよいセールスマンであれば、投資家を説得しようとするだけで良い。しかし、もっと信頼できる方法はユーザーを通して投資家を説得することだ: もしユーザーが愛する余り友人に教えたくなるようなサービスを作れば、そのベンチャーは指数的に成長し、その事実がどんな投資家でも説得してしまうだろう。

Being good is a particularly useful strategy for making decisions in complex situations because it's stateless. It's like telling the truth. The trouble with lying is that you have to remember everything you've said in the past to make sure you don't contradict yourself. If you tell the truth you don't have to remember anything, and that's a really useful property in domains where things happen fast.


For example, Y Combinator has now invested in 80 startups, 57 of which are still alive. (The rest have died or merged or been acquired.) When you're trying to advise 57 startups, it turns out you have to have a stateless algorithm. You can't have ulterior motives when you have 57 things going on at once, because you can't remember them. So our rule is just to do whatever's best for the founders. Not because we're particularly benevolent, but because it's the only algorithm that works on that scale.

例えば、Y Combinatorは現在80のベンチャー企業投資して、そのうち57のベンチャーが依然として続いている(残りはつぶれたか、合併したか、あるいは買収された)。57ものベンチャーにアドバイスをしようとすると、ステートレスなアルゴリズムを採用する必要があることが分かる。57もの物事を一度に処理しているときに秘めた動機なんか持っていられない。なぜなら逐一覚えていられないからだ。だから私たちのルールは創業者たちにとって最善のことをすると言うものだ。私たちがとりわけ慈善的だというわけではなく、その規模でうまくいくアルゴリズムがそれだけだと言うことだ。

When you write something telling people to be good, you seem to be claiming to be good yourself. So I want to say explicitly that I am not a particularly good person. When I was a kid I was firmly in the camp of bad. The way adults used the word good, it seemed to be synonymous with quiet, so I grew up very suspicious of it.


You know how there are some people whose names come up in conversation and everyone says "He's such a great guy?" People never say that about me. The best I get is "he means well." I am not claiming to be good. At best I speak good as a second language.


So I'm not suggesting you be good in the usual sanctimonious way. I'm suggesting it because it works. It will work not just as a statement of "values," but as a guide to strategy, and even a design spec for software. Don't just not be evil. Be good.




[1] Fifty years ago it would have seemed shocking for a public company not to pay dividends. Now many tech companies don't. The markets seem to have figured out how to value potential dividends. Maybe that isn't the last step in this evolution. Maybe markets will eventually get comfortable with potential earnings. (VCs already are, and at least some of them consistently make money.)


I realize this sounds like the stuff one used to hear about the "new economy" during the Bubble. Believe me, I was not drinking that kool-aid at the time. But I'm convinced there were some good ideas buried in Bubble thinking. For example, it's ok to focus on growth instead of profits -- but only if the growth is genuine. You can't be buying users; that's a pyramid scheme. But a company with rapid, genuine growth is valuable, and eventually markets learn how to value valuable things.


[2] The idea of starting a company with benevolent aims is currently undervalued, because the kind of people who currently make that their explicit goal don't usually do a very good job.


It's one of the standard career paths of trustafarians to start some vaguely benevolent business. The problem with most of them is that they either have a bogus political agenda or are feebly executed. The trustafarians' ancestors didn't get rich by preserving their traditional culture; maybe people in Bolivia don't want to either. And starting an organic farm, though it's at least straightforwardly benevolent, doesn't help people on the scale that Google does.


Most explicitly benevolent projects don't hold themselves sufficiently accountable. They act as if having good intentions were enough to guarantee good effects.


[3] Users dislike their new operating system so much that they're starting petitions to save the old one. And the old one was nothing special. The hackers within Microsoft must know in their hearts that if the company really cared about users they'd just advise them to switch to OSX.


Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.

このエッセーの原稿を読んでくれた Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morrisに感謝する。

*1:Shiroさんの解釈: "you're just asking to be made a fool of" ここのmake a fool ofは「見下される」みたいなニュアンスの方が良いと思います。ここの比喩についての私の解釈はこうです:*技術者の仲間うちで* "that's technically impossible" と言い切るのは一種の敗北宣言なんですね。あるいは、「技術を実現するにあたっては常に時間と資源の制約を受けるため、純粋に技術的な上限というのを見極めるのは極めて難しい」という性質をわかってないと思われるか。とにかく技術者は、"that"s techically *possible*, but we don't have enough resources." のように言うことはあっても、*無限定*で "that's technically impossible." と言うことはまず無いし、そういうことばかり言ってると技術者として見てもらえなくなるんじゃないかと。で、それと同様に、"betting against benevolence" というのも、言ってみれば「愛があれば人間何とかなるっさ!」という、(少なくとも多くの人が信じたがっている) 命題を真っ向から否定することになるので、軽蔑の眼差しを受けることは避け難い、みたいな論の流れかなあと。


shiroshiro 2008/05/17 22:25 まだ最初の方しか見ていませんが…


4パラグラフ目、eitherAorBのAの部分がおかしい様な。 ビジネスはチャリティでは無いので背理法により前提のどっちか若しくは両方が間違っていたか



shiroshiro 2008/05/17 22:50 続き。

あと、when you scan down the list of ... の下りはたぶん、トラフィックの多いwebサイトのリストを眺めると、Craigslistは(おそらくNYTimesとかよく聞くwebsiteに混じって)結構上位にいるんだけれど、それらの企業の社員数を見てみるとCraigslistだけ極端に少ない、ってことを言ってるんだと思います。(ここのemployeesはCraislist自体のemployeesで、Craigslistを「通じて」職をみつけた人ではないです)。確か20人とか30人とかのレンジだったような。
で、その次の文は、多くのベンチャー企業はCraiglistが占める位置 (トラフィックと収益) になら喜んで入るだろうってことです。


9パラグラフ目、googleの文での暗黙の比較対象はCraigslistではなく、ビジネスよりもチャリティに似ていたってことです。広告を出してなかったのは1年*以上*。したがって1年目は非営利企業と区別がつかなかったと。最後の文は、たぶんNPOがやってたら1年目のgoogleのところまで到達するのが限界だったであろう (その後の進歩は無かっただろう) ってニュアンスが出る方が良いのでは。

10パラグラフ目、s/仕様/しよう/ (typo)。it would cost something to run は「多くの金」が必要ってわけじゃなくて、いくばくかの経費がかかるだろうけどそれを助成金や募金でまかなうのは大変だろうって話です。

11パラグラフ目: had toが抜けてる?

12パラグラフ目: 最後の文が抜けてる?

「power」2パラグラフ目: how far it would goは深い意味っていうよりも、かなりいいとこまでいけるんじゃないかって感じです。


shiroshiro 2008/05/18 07:31 しつこくすみません。続きです。

power 4パラグラフ目: ”you’re just asking to be made a fool of” ここのmake a fool ofは「見下される」みたいなニュアンスの方が良いと思います。ここの比喩についての私の解釈はこうです:*技術者の仲間うちで* ”that’s technically impossible” と言い切るのは一種の敗北宣言なんですね。あるいは、「技術を実現するにあたっては常に時間と資源の制約を受けるため、純粋に技術的な上限というのを見極めるのは極めて難しい」という性質をわかってないと思われるか。とにかく技術者は、”that’s techically *possible*, but we don’t have enough resources.” のように言うことはあっても、*無限定*で ”that’s technically impossible.” と言うことはまず無いし、そういうことばかり言ってると技術者として見てもらえなくなるんじゃないかと。で、それと同様に、”betting against benevolence” というのも、言ってみれば「愛があれば人間何とかなるっさ!」という、(少なくとも多くの人が信じたがっている) 命題を真っ向から否定することになるので、軽蔑の眼差しを受けることは避け難い、みたいな論の流れかなあと。

power 5パラグラフ目: Surely Microsoft isn’t be benevolent? これは修辞疑問で、”Microsoft is evil” というコンセンサスが前提になってると思います。「マイクロソフトはもちろん慈善じゃないよね。」
最後の文は、「これって、今みんながGoogleに期待しているようなことだよね」 日本語だと時制の微妙なニュアンスがうまくマップできないので「今」などの副詞を入れて読者を過去の話から現在に引き戻すとわかりやすくなるのではないかと思います。

power 6パラグラフ目: Yet it doesn’t seem to pay. これは、マイクロソフトは人から罵られるような汚いやりかたをしているにもかかわらず、それほど見返り (<= 急成長、株価の急上昇) はないじゃないかって議論だと思います。

morale 1パラグラフ目: evidenceはここでは「形跡」みたいなニュアンスでどうでしょう。というのは、ここまで、外から見たbenevolenceと企業の成長の関連についてのケーススタディをやってきたわけですよね。で、ここから、内側に潜ってbenevolenceがどういうメカニズムで成長に寄与するかを見てゆこうってわけですから、「これまで見てきたように、慈善がうまく行っているようにみえるケースは多い。でもなぜうまくいくんだろう?」 という話の振りだと思います。

morale 2パラグラフ目: roller coasterは日本語では「ジェットコースター」の方が通るんでは? doomedは「破滅している」と言ってしまうと終了しちゃったみたいなので、破滅しそうになるとか、あるいはニュアンスとしては「袋小路にはまり込んでいる」「命運尽きたかのように感じられる」とか?

morale 3パラグラフ目: 訳文だとたまごっちが誰のためのものかがちょっとわかりづらいかなと思いました (一瞬、ユーザのためのものにも読める)。

morale 4パラグラフ目: 「Evan Williamsがやってきて次の日から〜」だと、その時点ではじめてEvanがやってきたようにも読めてしまう感じがします。これは小説的な描写だと思います。昨日まで賑やかだったオフィス。今日もファウンダーであるEvanは仕事に出てくる。いつも先に来て「おはよう、Evan」と声をかけてくれていた彼らはもういない。自分で鍵をあけて、暗いオフィスに電気を灯す。あれ、オフィスってこんなに広かったのか… みたいな感じの、寂しい状況の描写。

help 2 パラグラフ目: is locked in: 「身動きがとれない」とすると受け身で状況に甘んじている感じがしちゃう気がします。もうちょっと勇ましく戦ってるイメージがあってもいいかなあと。巨人に追いかけられる青年、いよいよ躱せないというところに追い詰められて、腹を決めて向き直り、がっぷりと四つに組む…みたいなイメージかなあ。「戦いの真っ最中だ」くらいでもいい気がしますが。

help ラストパラグラフ: the very best hackers tend to be idealistic: tend toは落とさない方が良いのでは? desperate for a job 仕事を必要としていないだとちょっと言い過ぎのような。仕事を必死に探す必要がない、とか。

compass 1パラグラフ目: a thousand things you *could* do. なので可能性について言っているのではないかと。

compass 5パラグラフ目: typo s/地区いつ/逐一/ かな。

compass 最後から2パラグラフ目: typo s/消して/決して/

compass 最後のパラグラフ: in the usual sanctimonius wayはsuggestingにかかってるんですよね?

注釈2、2パラグラフ目: people in Bolivia don’t want to either は、「ボリビアの人々だって(彼らの伝統的農法を保存するということを)望んではいないかもしれない」です。だから、伝統的な有機農法を守るための運動というのはfeebly executionである、というふうにつながってゆきます。

注釈2、3パラグラフ目: ここは現存する、「explicitly benevolent = はっきりと慈善を掲げた」プロジェクトについて言っています。なので第一文は一般的な話ではなくて、今ある慈善を看板にしたプロジェクトのほとんどはちゃんとアカウンタビリティを保ってないっていう批判ですね。(これを「会社」にすればアカウンタビリティは必要とされるってことで、最初の方の議論が下敷きになっています)。

注釈3: The hackers within Microsoft must know in their heartsは「内心では〜だと思っているに違いない」じゃないでしょうか。

sirocco634sirocco634 2008/05/18 10:32 >Shiroさん
# Craigslistとかは完全に分かっていなかった気がします(..;)

# まだCやJavaのイロハを覚えるので手一杯ですが、そのうちGaucheに手を出してみますね。とりあえず本は購入させていただきました!