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チベット学会

チベット学会報(Tibetan Studies Association Bulletin)

チベット学会報第4号[平成30年(2018年)]

チベット学会報第4号[平成30年(2018年)]

Pp. 1-14.

An Analysis of Inter-ethnic-religious Conflicts and Conflict Resolutions in Ladakh, Western Tibet

                          

Takashi Irimoto, Ph.D.,

Professor Emeritus, Hokkaido University, Japan

1. Introduction

Ladakh is the site of an ancient kingdom, located in an arid high-altitude zone along the upper Indus River between the Greater Himalaya mountains and the Karakoram range in northwest India. Ladakh is now a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a region of unsettled national borders in the middle of continuing disputes with neighboring countries: Pakistan in the west, China in the north, and Tibet in the east. Furthermore, ethnic and religious confrontations between Muslims and Buddhists have led to violent clashes inside Ladakh. These troubles have been addressed by the Constitution Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Tribes Order, enacted by the President of the Republic of India in 1989, and the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act (LAHDC Act) in 1995. An effect of the order and the act is to transfer control of regional development from the Indian federal government and the Jammu and Kashmir state government to the LAHDC in Ladakh. Nevertheless, the state of conflict has continued up to today, without a complete settlement.

In these conditions, Buddhist Ladakhis have sought world support in dealing with Muslims in Kashmir and Pakistan, and in dealing with China, through strengthening their solidarity with the now-globalized Tibetan Buddhism, headed by the Dalai Lama XIV, an internationally recognized Nobel Peace Prize winner and a symbol of nonviolence. At the same time, Ladakhis are developing various conflict resolution strategies toward a multiethnic and multi-religious coexistence while aiming at keeping their traditional culture and identity as Ladakhis.

This presentation examines the meaning of the presence of the Dalai Lama in Ladakh and his role in peacekeeping there, especially from the perspective of the ethical strategy for conflict resolution.

2. Historical Background of the Conflict

2.1. The Time of the Ladakh Kingdom

While The Royal Chronicles of Ladakh (La dvags rgyal rabs)1 are decorated with descriptions of the accomplishments of the various kings of the Ladakh dynasties and the flourishing of Buddhism, it is possible to read into the background to The Chronicles a history of religious conflict both among Buddhist schools and between Buddhism and Islam. The history of the Ladakh Kingdom is divided into its formative period (c. 900−1400, the first Ladakh dynasty), developmental period (c. 1400−1600, the first half of the second Ladakh dynasty), and its decline (c. 1600−1834, the second half of the second Ladakh dynasty). 2

There is evidence that the issue of the islamization of Kashmir had already arisen during the latter half of the first Ladakh dynasty. Lha chen rgyal bu rin chen (c. 1320−1350) was possibly Kashmir’s first Muslim king. Francke 3 sees Lha chen rgyal bu rin chen and Rainchan Shah (Riñchana bhotta) as the same person based on the fact that their dates and names match, as well as their shared title of rgyal bu (prince).

During the fifteenth century, Lha chen grags’ bum lde chose Blo gros mchog ldan, the last king of the first Ladakh dynasty, as his successor to the throne. However, the former had two other sons. The seventh section of The Royal Chronicles of Ladakh discusses Lha chen bha gan turning against the sons of Grags’ bum lde: the above-mentioned “Blo gros mchog ldan” as well as “Drung pa’a li” and “Slab bstan dar rgyal.” Half of the second child’s name is Muslim. Francke speculates that this was because the Muslim king of Kashmir, Zainu’l ’ābidīn, who had defeated Ladakh, made King Grags’ bum lde marry a Muslim wife.4 Gergan and Hassnain 5 think that Zainu’l ’ābidīn defeated Guge and reached Shey and Mulbekh in Ladakh under the loyal protection of the head of Baltistan. However, since it is said that Zainu’l ’ābidīn was also tolerant of Hinduism and did not persecute Buddhism, the latter religion was probably not really harmed in Ladakh. Rather, it seems that he tried to islamize Kashmir through a marriage-based relationship with the Ladakh Kingdom.

A similar example can be found during the reign of the Ladakh king ‘Jam dbyangs rnam rgyal (c.1560−1590), who came two generations after the founder of the second Ladakh dynasty, Lha chen bha gan. He aimed to make peace with the Balti army by marrying the daughter of Ali mir sher khan, Rgyal kha thun. In other words, due to the advance of Ali mir sher khan of Skar rdo, all of Ladakh came under the control of the Balti army, and ‘Jam dbyangs rnam rgyal became Ali mir’s prisoner of war. The latter then gave his own daughter Rgyal kha thun to be the wife of the former and made him the king. Thus the Ladakh king was allowed to return home with Rgyal kha thun. Subsequently, Rgyal kha thun would have two sons: Seng ge rnam rgyal (“Lion King”) and Nor bu rnam rgyal. During this time, islamization had already spread to not only the countries west of the Ladakh Kingdom but also Pu rig, which had been part of the Ladakh Kingdom. Princes Cig tan and Dkar rtse of Pu rig converted to Islam, called themselves “sultan” (Muslim king), and did not follow the wishes of the Ladakh Kingdom.

The Ladakh Kingdom was defeated by neighboring countries throughout the second Ladakh dynasty. According to Śrīvara’s Kashmir Royal Chronicles, the Kashmiri king Hasan Khān aimed to invade the Ladakh Kingdom during the time of Lha chen bha gan (c.1470-1500)6. His son Bkra shis rnam rgyal fought and defeated Hor. Furthermore, in 1531, General Mizra Hyder invaded Ladakh and tried to get the residents of Nubra to accept Islam. However, the nobles and head of Nubra rejected this and either killed or took prisoner members of his party. Subsequently, the army entered Leh, and two of its rulers accepted Islam.7 According to Stein 8 Mizra Hyder advanced along with the Kashgar (Turkistan) sultan Said Khan to central Tibet between 1531 and 1533. Furthermore, during the time of Seng ge rnam rgyal (c.1569-1594), an army led by the Balti king ‘Adam mkhan tried to defeat Ladakh but was driven back at a battle in Mkhar bu. The Royal Chronicles of Ladakh state that many Hors were killed there. They seem to have been Mughal soldiers. 9 Regardless, it can be seen as a battle between Buddhists and Muslims.

The Mongolian War (c. 1679−1685) during the time of Lha chen bde legs rnam rgyal (of the second Ladakh dynasty) was a battle between the Tibetan-Mongolian Army and the Ladakh Army, as well as the Tibetan-Mongolian Army and the Kashmiri Army. However, it can also be seen as a power struggle over the Ladakh Kingdom between Tibet, which was under the Mongolian Empire, and Kashmir, which was under the Mughal Empire. It was an extension of religious conflict between Buddhism and Islam. Due to the Mongolian War, the Ladakh Kingdom lost its eastern area of Mnga’ ris skor gsum and had its trading activities restricted by both Tibet and Kashmir. However, Kashmir and the Tibetan Dalai Lama’s regime did not succeed in islamization or in making the Gelugpa School of Buddhism the state religion, respectively.

Because of the Mongolian War, the Ladakh Kingdom's hegemony was markedly curtailed. Nevertheless, one can see the Ladakh Kingdom as having aimed to prevent Tibetan rule, eliminate Kashmir’s islamization of its kingdom, and survive as an independent state by opposing the powerful Tibetan-Mongolian Army with the Kashmiri Army, despite the economic burden this placed on both itself and Kashmir. However, the Ladakh Kingdom subsequently lost its independence in the Dogra War (1834). It came under the rule of the Sikh Empire vassal state in Dogra (Jammu) of King Gulab Singh. After the independence of India, it became part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

2-2. The Time after the independence of India

Upon India’s independence in 1947, Muslims broke off from India’s Hindus and established Pakistan as an Islamic state. At the time, while Muslims were the majority in Jammu and Kashmir, they were under the rule of a Hindu raja. Thus the state ended up belonging to India. However, Pakistan asserted its territorial right to Kashmir, and the first Indo-Pakistani War (1947−1948) began. In 1949, a provisional ceasefire line was established through the mediation of the United Nations.

Subsequently, battles took place in Ladakh, Zanskar, Baltistan, and the area around the border in Northeastern India (the present-day state of Arunachal Pradesh) during the Sino-Indian Border Conflict (1959−1962). In the Aksai Chin highlands (part of the Nubra district in Northern Ladakh), China built a military road in an area without an established border and continues its control today. The second war between India and Pakistan took place in 1965−66, and the third (the Bangladesh Liberation War) in 1971 in Eastern Pakistan.10

The 1972 Simla Agreement decided that Pakistan would manage Western Kashmir’s Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, and Baltistan, and that India would manage Eastern Kashmir’s state of Jammu and Kashmir (including Ladakh). This ceasefire line remains in effect today. However, Pakistan asserted that the entirety of the Kashmir area (including Ladakh) was part of its territory, calling it “Free Kashmir.” Even today, there are repeated battles along the border.

As I have described above, throughout the first and second Ladakh dynasties, islamized countries to the west of the Ladakh Kingdom continued to defeat it. This was accompanied by not only direct military activities and fighting, but also through the establishment of relationships based on marriage between Ladakh kings and Muslim queens. As a result, Ladakh became a society in which many ethnicities and religions (such as Buddhism and Islam) co-existed. However, in the subsequent wars between India and Pakistan and the Sino-Indian border conflict, Ladakh faced off again with Islam, as well as with China.

There are three types of Muslims in Ladakh. The first are the Balti people, who originally shared the Tibetan language and culture and subsequently converted to the Shia branch of Islam. They came to Ladakh from Baltistan after peace was made with the Balti army during the early period of the second Ladakh dynasty. The second are the Kashmiris who belong to the Sunni branch and came to Ladakh from Kashmir, which was part of the Mughal Empire, after the Mongolian War. The third are the Sunni branch Kashmiris who came seeking jobs after the ban on non-Ladakhis entering Ladakh was lifted in 1974. The Sunni branch currently forms the majority in the Kashmiri government. In Ladakh, they are seen as outsiders, and the word for Kashmiri (Kache) is a synonym for Sunni. The Sunni and Shia branches are mutually antagonistic. While belonging to a different religion, Buddhist Ladakhis see Baltis of the latter branch, who share ethnic elements with them, as friends. Put in more exact terms, Buddhists are currently not antagonistic towards “Muslims” but towards “Sunni Muslims.” I will describe this antagonism in more detail in the next section.

3. Recent Developments in the Conflict

In the 1980s, with the ban on non-Ladakhis entering Ladakh having been lifted in 1974, Ladakhis’ dissatisfaction with Kashmiris grew large due to an increase in the number of tourists and economic changes. It took the form of direct disapproval of the economic advancement of Sunni Muslim merchants, who had come from Srinagar seeking jobs and were buying up stores and hotels in the Leh bazaar, as well as of Muslim taxi drivers and tourist guides giving incorrect explanations to tourists about monasteries’ Buddhist statues due to inadequate knowledge about the religion. Buddhists said that they were “destroying Ladakh culture,” “dirtying the city,” and so on. In recent years, Buddhists have objected to many Buddhist women being required to convert to Sunni Islam when marrying a member of the branch.

Against this background, from 1980 to 1981, Ladakhis held demonstrations on the main street of the Leh bazaar, calling for Ladakhis to become a “scheduled tribe,” a status that is assigned to developing peoples in India. If Ladakhis were recognized as such, they would receive preferential treatment by the Indian government just like peoples in scheduled low castes. Buddhists and Ladakh Muslims jointly engaged in this struggle.

However, conflict subsequently arose between these two groups as well. The 1989 conflict began with a July 7th fight between Muslim and Buddhist youth at a movie theater in Leh.11 Due to a Muslim throwing a bomb into Gompa Soma, a monastery in Leh’s bazaar, and people continually throwing rocks at each other, the first 24-hour curfew order was issued. Furthermore, on July 28th, Muslims demonstrated on the major street in the Leh bazaar, asserting their desire to join Pakistan. While up until then this demand had been voiced in Srinagar, it was its first airing in Ladakh. Buddhists felt a sense of crisis. In response, on the same day, multiple Ladakh women walked down the same street yelling and holding placards telling “Pakistani Agents Get out of Ladakh.” Another demonstration took place the next day in front of a Sunni mosque after the departure from Gompa Soma. Ladakhi Buddhists thought that behind Ladakhi Muslims were Srinagar Sunnis.

Furthermore, on August 6th in Nyemo (located in Western Leh, on the way to Kalatse), Buddhists threw rocks at a taxi driven by a Muslim with four German tourists inside that was heading to a campsite in Saspol. The taxi driver suffered injuries after being assaulted and was then taken in a military truck to a Leh hospital. Due to this, Saspol and Nyemo were placed under military control. On August 8th, the houses of multiple Sunni Muslim families in the village of Shey (Eastern Leh) were burned down. Police officers fired shots and multiple people were injured. This led to the villages of Shey, Thikse, and Chushot being placed under military rule. On the same day, there was a general strike in Ladakh. It was led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association and called for India’s central government to make Ladakh a union territory of India.

After the first 24-hour curfew was issued, attacks were primarily carried out by Buddhists against Muslims. They appear to have been revenge for a Muslim throwing a bomb into a Buddhist monastery during the first conflict. However, after the second 24-hour curfew was issued, which prevented Buddhists from carrying out their plans to have another demonstration, it is said that Muslims attacked Buddhists in the following ways. First, they destroyed part of the Rangdum Monastery in the Zanskar district. The Rangdum Monastery is on the way to Kargil from Zanskar. It marks the border between the Islamic area and Buddhist area, so to speak. Second, they destroyed three Buddhist statues engraved into rock in Dras. As historical relics showing the spread of Buddhism, these statues were also seen as such a border. Third, in Kargil and Srinagar, Buddhist taxi drivers who had come from Ladakh were attacked. Fourth, Ladakh Buddhist children who were attending a Srinagar school were attacked. For this reason, all of the children at the school returned to Ladakh, and some were then transferred to a school in Jammu. In response to these attacks by Muslims on Buddhists, Buddhists carried out retributive attacks on Muslims in various villages in Ladakh. For this reason, a 24-hour curfew was issued for the third time.

At this point, religion was being used by individuals and groups as a distinguishing sign, and a conflict turned into antagonism among religions. The conflict between Buddhists and Muslims arose amidst rapid modernization due to recent economic competition between Ladakhis and Kashmiris who came from Srinagar seeking jobs. However, this internal Ladakh issue became linked with the issue of Kashmir’s national identity and gave rise to widespread religious and political antagonism, leading to violent clashes. Furthermore, Ladakhi Buddhists’ demands changed from acquiring the status of a scheduled tribe to becoming a union territory. While this demand regarding Ladakh’s political status has been made repeatedly since India’s independence, this was the first time that it took on a life as a political movement accomplished through religious antagonism and violent clashes.

4. Strategies for Solving the Conflict

“Union territories” refer to governmental administrative organizations directly placed under the central Indian government (like Delhi). If Ladakh were to become a union territory, it would receive national subsidies and government-related jobs directly. Since Ladakh is currently under the Jammu and Kashmir state government, the national government’s funds come to Ladakh through it. This means that funds are distributed to benefit Muslims, who are the majority in the state government. Furthermore, public officials involved in Ladakh and the city of Leh are appointed based entirely on the will of the Kashmiri state government. This demand to become a union territory emerged as the result of Buddhist Ladakhis’ dissatisfaction with being ignored as a minority under the Jammu and Kashmir state government explosively rising to the surface all at once. Therefore, they aimed to achieve Ladakh’s independence from Jammu and Kashmir, and have it placed under the direct supervision of the central Indian government.

From the perspective of the Ladakh Kingdom’s historical independence, we could say that Ladakh’s inclusion within the state is itself the cause of the current problem. If that is the case, achieving Ladakh’s independence is certainly the most effective political strategy for solving this problem. The demand to become a union territory had been made by Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, who was a member of the Indian Parliament representing Ladakh as well as the head of the Gelugpa School in Ladakh. To heighten people’s consciousness and emotions, there was a need to form the independent identity of “ Buddhist Ladakhis” that is centered on religious antagonism between Buddhists and Muslims. In other words, the religion of Buddhism is being used as a symbol of Ladakh ethnic identity.

Buddhism has the greatest power in the everyday life of Ladakhi people as well as politics.12 Therefore, an alliance with Tibetan Buddhism—which is headed by the Dalai Lama—would make possible wide-scale international cooperation in resisting Islam. To handle this situation, the Ladakh Buddhist Association chose to carry out this realistic and effective method of appealing to people's religion. In this strategy, it can be seen that—just as Ladakh tried to oppose the Mongolian-Tibetan Army with the Kashmir army during the time of the Mongolian War—Ladakh was trying to counter-balance China, Pakistan, and Kashmir with India and Tibet.

Finally, a group of demonstrators and police clashed in Leh on August 27th. Four people died, and multiple people were wounded or arrested (including the head of the Ladakh Buddhist Association). The police sent those arrested to Kargil and Srinagar. On August 31st, demonstrations and strikes demanded their release. During this time, a Sunni mosque below the old palace in Leh was also blown up. As a result of this string of protests, on October 7th, the Indian president enacted the Constitution Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Tribes Order, 1989. However, Ladakh’s demand to become a union territory was not met. This order did not recognize Ladakh as united, but rather divided it into specific scheduled tribes: Balti (people who speak the Balti dialect of Tibetan), Beda (a musician caste), Bot/Boto (people who speak the Ladakh dialect of Tibetan), Drokpa (the Dard ethnic group), Changpa (people of the Changtang area), Gara (a blacksmith caste), Mon (a musician and carpenter caste), and Purigpa (people from the Purig area). Then, due to the Ladakh Autonomous Hill District Development Council Act, 1995, the actual rights for development planning were ultimately transferred from the Indian and Jammu and Kashmir governments to the Ladakh Council.13

In this way, while on the surface violent clashes have died down, the Kashmir and Ladakh issues have not reached any fundamental solution: people are still in a state of conflict.

5. The Role of the Dalai Lama

Over the past 40 years, the Dalai Lama has visited Ladakh repeatedly from Dharamsala, the seat of Tibet’s government in exile, and he gives lectures there to monks at monasteries as well as to laypersons. His close relationship with the region dates back to the time immediately after his exile from Tibet, when the late Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, then head of the Gelugpa Buddhist tradition in Ladakh, welcomed Tibetan refugees. Tibetan refugee camps were set up in Ladakh, and a summer residence for the Dalai was also built nearby. Ladakhis feel close to the Dalai Lama for these reasons. Above all, since the 1989 enactment in Ladakh of the Constitution Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Tribes Order and since receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, the Dalai Lama has come to actively speak up in public and take action on the Ladakh issue from an ethical point of view.

The Dalai Lama advocates the importance of secular ethics which are universal and transcend individual religions. He taught this ideal to the people of Ladakh at the 33rd Kalachakra initiation and teaching held there in 2014, attended by 150,000 people. This form of ethics dissolves ethnic and religious antagonism from inside the mind through the Buddhist teachings that everyone is equal, just as everyone wants to be happy, and that compassion for others is essential. These teachings are received in the Kalachakra initiation with the motive of aspiration to Buddhahood. The Dalai Lama went beyond words by himself forging friendly relations with former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who is a Muslim, and they displayed their amity in front of the audience at the Kalachakra initiation. This was followed by the closing speech for the ceremony, delivered by the Chief Executive Councilor of the LAHDC. He declared, as a representative of the Buddhists in Ladakh, that Buddhists and Muslims would join hands to follow the advice from the Dalai Lama toward harmony between all religions. 14

After the Kalachakra initiation ceremony, the Dalai Lama visited the LAHDC and the Central Institute of Buddhist Studies in Ladakh to address the importance of an education that includes training in secular ethics and respect for all religious traditions as well as individuals who have none. Furthermore, the Leh Muslim Co-ordination Committee invited the Dalai Lama to lunch.15 In his welcome address at the time, Saeed Naqvi praised the Dalai Lama for his efforts to promote mutual understanding and for becoming a symbol of worldwide peace and harmony. Furthermore, Saif ud din stated that the Leh Muslim Co-ordination Committee also supported taking a middle way approach to solving the difficulties in Tibet and that Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists had long lived in harmony and would probably continue to do so in the future. In response, the Dalai Lama called out to his Muslim spiritual brothers and sisters, mentioning that the village in which he was born (near the Kumbum Monastery) had included Muslim families, and that he had thus long been familiar with Muslims. He also described how around 1,000 Muslims lived in Lhasa when he arrived there at age five and that a Muslim representative had always played a role in government events. Since 1959, many Tibetan Muslims had left Tibet for Srinagar. He pointed out that when he visited the latter two years earlier, they spoke the Lhasa dialect of Tibetan, which showed that Tibetan was still used within families.

The Dalai Lama also described how since 1975 he had visited other religions’ places of worship, including several mosques, and had made many Muslim friends. He related how at the first anniversary memorial service held in Washington for victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks, he had expressed his firm belief that one could not make generalizations about Muslims merely based on the fact that those involved in the attacks were Muslim. Furthermore, he said that while he was Buddhist, he often intervened to defend Islam. He also described how Farooq Abdhullah, his friend and former chief minister of the Jammu and Kashmir government, had explained to him that jihad did not mean attacking others but to try to fight against one’s own disturbing emotions. Speaking to Ladakh’s Muslims, the Dalai Lama also said that restraining oneself from hurting someone was an example of jihad. He then called for them to consider methods that could influence their Muslim brothers to train themselves to act with such restraint amidst worldwide conflicts between the Sunnis and Shias, as well as between Christians and Islam.16

After showing that he understood and even defended Muslims, he presented the importance of restraining emotions based on an interpretation of the Islamic idea of jihad. Jihad originally means “fighting and effort for the path of God,” and comprises an internal fight (the greater jihad) and external battle with that which is not righteous (the lesser jihad).17 Therefore, the jihad described by Farooq Abdhullah is recognized within Islam. In fact, controlling one’s emotions corresponds to the Buddhist idea of “patience” or “perseverance” (Tib. zöpa). The method for doing so is traditionally described in detail in Buddhist scriptures as the “training of the mind” (Tib. lojong).18 By bringing up a method found in both Islamic and Buddhist doctrines—the controlling of one’s emotions and patience—the Dalai Lama was trying to maintain peace.

While Muslims are the majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, they are the minority in Ladakh. For them, forming a good relationship with the Dalai Lama is beneficial in that by doing so they can create amicable relations with Buddhists. Muslims also wish to avoid an intensification of the conflict. In other words, here the Dalai Lama is playing the role of a mediator who is halting clashes between the two groups. The Dalai Lama’s effort at unity would effectively avoid intensification of the ethnic-religious conflict between Buddhists and Muslims.

He pointed out that secular ethics are universal and transcend individual religions, and that it is important that they be instilled in the next generation as part of science-based education.19 Furthermore, he repeatedly pointed out that the Indian constitution itself is based on the secular idea of respecting not only all religions but also those who do not have a religion.20

Therefore, while secular ethics are based on the Buddhist philosophy of love and compassion, practical ethics transcend ethnicities and religions and are applicable to contemporary society. It is only natural that the Dalai Lama, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, would teach harmony and friendship between religions. Insofar as he takes a middle way approach with regard to the Tibet-China issue, his position will not change. As a result, the Dalai Lama maintains peace by appealing to people’s hearts and minds and actively playing the role of mediator between religions, even if the conflict in Ladakh is not completely resolved.

6. Conclusion

Against a historical background that stretches back to the time of the Ladakh Kingdom as well as recent rapid modernization, people in Ladakh have faced ethnic and religious conflict between Kashmir Muslims and Ladakh Buddhists. However, after a string of violent clashes, they were given the Constitution Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Tribes Order, 1989, and the Ladakh Autonomous Hill District Development Council Act, 1995.

It might seem to be at odds with the longtime political goal of Buddhist Ladakhis, which is to separate Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir and obtain the status of a union territory governed directly by the federal government. In fact, despite the BJP’s victory, the Minister of Home Affairs in 2015 rejected Ladakh becoming a union territory—which the BJP had supposedly promised by the slogan “Vote for BJP and UT for Ladakh” during the 2014 Indian national election. Ladakhis do not conceal their dissatisfaction with this, which they see as historical fraud. 21 Furthermore, when the Dalai Lama himself says that harmony and friendship between religions is important, he makes clear that he is aware that the people of Ladakh are not necessarily satisfied with the current resolution of this conflict.22

Nevertheless, the analysis of this presentation is that the Dalai Lama’s strategy for conflict resolution is the one that takes precedence for achieving peace among the multiethnic and multi-religious peoples of Ladakh.

References

Dalai Lama, the 14th (translated by Miura Junko),2012. Dalai Lama, Shukyo wo Koete (Dalai Lama, Beyond Religions). Tokyo, Sanga.

Francke, A. H.,1926 (rep. 1972). Antiquities of Indian Tibet. Part II. Archaeological Survey of India, New Imperial Series, Vol. L. New Delhi, S. Chand & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.

Francke, A. H., 1977 (orig. 1907) A History of Western Tibet. In Gergan, S. S. and F. M. Hassnain (eds.), A History of Ladakh. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., pp. 47-182.

Gergan, S. S. and F. M. Hassnain, 1977. Critical Introduction. In In Gergan, S. S. and F. M. Hassnain (eds.), A History of Ladakh. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., pp. 1-46.

Geshe Sonam Gyaltsen Gonta, 2007. Yattsu no Shiju ni yoru Kokoro no Kunren (Lojong: Practices of the Mind by the Eight Phrase). Tokyo, Potala College.

Irimoto, Takashi,1986a. Ladakh Okokushi no Jinruigakuteki Kosatsu – Rekishi Seitaigakuteki Shiten (An Anthropological Study on the History of the Kingdom of Ladakh – A Historical-Ecological Approach). Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology, Vol. 11, No. 2: 403-455.

Irimoto, Takashi, 1986b. Ladakh Okokushi Oboegaki. In H. Tamura, Umesao, T., et.al. Himalaya Bukkyo Okoku. Vol. 1. Ningen Mandara Kai (A Memorandum of the History of the Kingdom of Ladakh. In Buddhist Kingdoms in Himalaya. Vol. 1. Human Mandala World). Tokyo, Sanseido, pp. 214-222.

Irimoto, Takashi, 1989. Field data during the 6th Ladakh Expedition, 1989/05-1989/08.

Irimoto, Takashi, 2014. Ladakh Bukkyo Soin to Sairei (Buddhist Monasteries and Festivals in Ladakh). Kyoto, Hozokan. pp. 1-692.

Irimoto, Takashi, 2014 Field data on the 33rd Kalachakra initiation and teaching by H.H. the Dalai Lama in Leh, Ladakh, 2014/07/03-13.

Irimoto, Takashi, 2015/2016 Field data on the Speech during Jangchup Lamrim Teachings/16 Drops of Kadam Initiation/Long-Life Empowerment and Puja by H.H. the Dalai Lama, at Tashi Lhumpo Monastery, Bylakuppe, 2015/12/20-2016/01/01.

Irimoto, Takashi, 2016 Field data on the Teaching of Nyu Bosatsu Gyo Ron (Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa: Entering the Practices of Boddhisattva), by H.H. the Dalai Lama in Osaka, Japan, 2016/05/10-13.

Śāntideva(translated and noted by Geshe Sonam Gyaltsen Gonta and Nishimura Kaori)

2009 (orig. 7th cen.). Nyu Bosatsu Gyo Ron (Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa: Entering the Practices of Boddhisattva. Tokyo, Potala College.

Stein, R. A. (translated by Yamaguchi, Z. and Sadakata),1971. Chibetto no Bunka (orig. Stein, R. A. 1962, La Civilisation Tibe`tiane. Paris, Dunod, Editeur). Tokyo, Iwanami-Shoten.

Yamada, Takako, 2009. Ladakh – Nishi Chibetto ni okeru Yamai to Chiryo no Minzokushi (Ladakh – Ethnography of Illness and Healing in Western Tibet). Kyoto, Kyoto University Press.

URL

Inpa-Senso (Indo-Pakistani War) http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 2016/05/17.

Jihado (jihad) http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 2016/05/08.

http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/1156-dismantling-the-kalachakra-sand-mandala-visiting-educational-projects-and-a-lunch-hosted-by-the-muslim-co-ordination-committee-leh... 2014/07/19.

http://www.reachladakh.com/a-step-towards-transparency-of-government-4th-lahdc-la...2015/08/11

http://www.reachladakh.com/print_news-details.php?pID=3090 2015/11/20

Notes:

1. Francke 1926; 1977.

2. Irimoto 1986a;1986b ; 2014: 32-36.

3. Francke 1926:98; 1977: 94-96.

4. Francke, 1926:102.

5. Gergan and Hassnain 1977:20.

6. Francke 1926:102.

7. Gergan and Hassnain, 1977:25.

8. Stein 1971:78.

9. Francke 1926:110.

10. Inpa-Senso(Indo-Pakistani War) http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 2016/05/17.

11. Irimoto 1989 Field data during the 6th Ladakh Expedition, 1989/05-1989/08. ; Irimoto 2014:566−571.

12. Irimoto 2014:585-615.

13. Yamada 2009:182‐184.

14. Irimoto 2014 Field data on the 33rd Kalachakra initiation and teaching by H.H. the Dalai Lama in Leh, Ladakh, 2014/07/03-13.

15. http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/1156-dismantling-the-kalachakra-sand-mandala-visiting-educational-projects-and-a-lunch-hosted-by-the-muslim-co-ordination-committee-leh... 2014/07/19.

16. http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/1156-dismantling-the-kalachakra-sand-mandala-visiting-educational-projects-and-a-lunch-hosted-by-the-muslim-co-ordination-committee-leh... 2014/07/19.

17. Jihado(jihad) http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 2016/05/08

18. Geshe Sonam Gyaltsen Gonta 2007 Yattsu no Shiju ni yoru Kokoro no Kunren (Lojong: Training of the Mind by the Eight Phrase), Tokyo, Potala College. ;Śāntideva(translated and noted by Geshe Sonam Gyaltsen Gonta and Nishimura Kaori)2009 Nyu Bosatsu Gyo Ron (Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa: Entering the Practices of Boddhisattva, Tokyo, Potala College.; Irimoto 2016 Field data on the Teaching of Nyu Bosatsu Gyo Ron(Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa: Entering the Practices of Boddhisattva, by H.H. the Dalai Lama in Osaka, Japan, 2016/05/10-13.

19. Dalai Lama the 14th (translated by Miura Junko) 2012 Dalai Lama, Shukyo wo Koete (Dalai Lama, Beyond Religions), Tokyo, Sanga.

20. http://www.reachladakh.com/a-step-towards-transparency-of-government-4th-lahdc-la...2015/08/11

21. http://www.reachladakh.com/print_news-details.php?pID=3090 2015/11/20

22. Irimoto 2015/2016 Field data on the Speech during Jangchup Lamrim Teachings/16 Drops of Kadam Initiation/Long-Life Empowerment and Puja by H.H. the Dalai Lama, at Tashi Lhumpo Monastery, Bylakuppe, 2015/12/20-2016/01/01.

PS:This research was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) with its Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Grant Number JP15KT0124) for FY 2015 to FY 2017.

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