前回エントリは意外に多くの反響を頂いた。そこで紹介したNBER論文のungated版は見当たらなかったが、それを取り上げたVox記事「Study: austerity helped the Nazis come to power」があった。


There’s a hole in the traditional argument that the Great Depression explains the rise of the Nazis: Lots of other countries suffered during the Depression, too, without collapsing into totalitarian dictatorships.

“During the 1920s, there was no substantial difference in the economic performance of nations that, in the mid-1930s, were democratic regimes or dictatorships,” the authors note. “The depth of the depression was only slightly greater in Germany than in France or the Netherlands, and was even worse in Austria (and other eastern European nations) and the USA.” Of those countries, Austria also saw a radical right-wing dictatorship come to power under Engelbert Dollfuss, in 1932. But France, the Netherlands, and the US did not see radical right-wing parties take office.

Also troubling for the most simplistic economic explanation is the fact that unemployed people weren't particularly likely to vote for Nazis. The authors cite reams of research showing that the unemployed were likelier to vote for the Communists or the Social Democrats. “It was not that Hitler did not try to appeal the unemployed masses,” they note, “but rather that the Communist Party was perceived as the party that traditionally represented workers’ interests.”





One uniquely German factor that might help explain the Nazis' rise are the harsh war reparations, totaling 260 percent of Germany's 1913 GDP, that World War I's victors imposed under the Treaty of Versailles. As early as 1920, John Maynard Keynes was warning that the economic pain caused by forcing Germany to pay that debt could lead to the rise of a dictatorship.

But the authors note that Germany's debt was mostly not repaid; US President Herbert Hoover announced a moratorium on the payments in 1931, and then they were suspended by the Allies in the Lausanne Conference in 1932. They do not dismiss the idea that the reparations played a role, particularly after Brüning, in his role as chancellor, publicly denounced the reparations system in 1931, which led international capital markets to worry that Germany wouldn't repay its debts, and made it harder for the country to borrow. The authors just don’t think that it, and the Great Depression itself, are sufficient explanations.

That's where austerity comes in. The scale of the cutback that Brüning enacted from 1930 to 1932 is truly staggering. The authors estimate that Brüning cut German government spending by about 15 percent, after inflation, from 1930 to 1932. He raised income taxes on high earners by an average of 10 percent, and slashed unemployment, pension, and welfare benefits.

The economic consequences were horrific. GDP fell by 15 percent, as did government revenue. Unemployment increased from 22.7 percent to 43.8 percent. Brüning came to be known as the “Hunger Chancellor.”

“Although Germany was not the only country hit by the Depression, it was the only major country to implement prolonged and deep austerity measures,” the authors write. Britain, by contrast, actually increased government spending during this period.








Galofré-Vilà, Meissner, McKee, and Stuckler are hardly the first people to tie the pain caused by austerity to the rise of the Nazis, but they’re among the few to have tried to quantify the effect. They first estimate the level of austerity in each state and district in Germany using each local area’s average tax rate. While Brüning’s government increased income taxes across the board, most income taxes were local, so the federal tax hikes resulted in different-sized tax hikes in different areas. And, the authors find, areas that saw bigger increases in their average tax rates also saw larger vote shares for the Nazi Party in the July 1932, November 1932, and March 1933 elections.

They find similar results if you define austerity as state and local spending cuts, or use a measure combining both spending cuts and changes in income or wage tax rates. "Regardless of how we measure austerity, the estimated association of austerity with the Nazi vote share is positive and statistically significant in most of the models considering the different elections between 1930 and 1933," they conclude.

According to one estimate, a 1 percent increase in spending cuts is associated with a 1.825 percentage point increase in the Nazi vote share. The results are even stronger if you look only at cuts to municipal pensions, unemployment support, and health care, and they hold up if you use Nazi party membership as the dependent variable, rather than Nazi vote share.






“At the upper end of these point estimates,” the authors write, “it is plausible to argue that the Nazis might never have achieved power in March 1933 since it would have required coalition partners to supply up to 11 percent of the votes.” In reality, after the March election (during which Hitler was already Chancellor) the Nazis maintained their coalition with the hard-right German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, or DNVP), which controlled about 8 percent of votes in the Reichstag.

The difference between being 8 percent short of a Reichstag majority and 11 percent short might not seem very large. And, to be sure, it’s possible Hitler would’ve been able to retain the chancellorship even if he had slightly fewer Reichstag seats. His rise to power was not purely electoral: the 1933 election was characterized by widespread violent intimidation, especially targeting Social Democrats and Communists, by Nazi militias.

At the time of the election, German President Paul von Hindenburg had already issued the Reichstag Fire Decree, giving Hitler vast powers to suppress dissent. He’d eventually use those powers to arrest all Communist and some Social Democratic members of the Reichstag, allowing, within weeks of the election, the passage of the Enabling Act and Germany’s all-out collapse into dictatorship. Perhaps Hitler could’ve used the same powers to seize control of the German state despite a lower vote total.

But the results are nonetheless a reminder of how shaky Hitler’s parliamentary coalition was, and how a vote swing of a few percentage points could have threatened to end his tenure as chancellor less than two months after it began.


「これらの点推定の上限を使えば、連立相手が票の11%を提供することが必要となるため、ナチス1933年3月に政権を奪取できなかった、と論ずることは可能です」と著者たちは書いている。実際には、(ヒトラーが既に首相だった)3月の選挙後にナチス極右ドイツ国家人民党(Deutschnationale VolksparteiないしDNVP)との連立を維持したが、同党は国会の票の約8%を握っていた。




この記事の最後では、米国を含む現代の情勢と当時の情勢を比較している。同じくこの研究を取り上げたビジネスインサイダー記事「1930s Germany shows us that bad tax policy can magnify Washington's worst problem by 1,000」やニューズウィーク記事「Raising Taxes And Cutting Social Programs Led to Hitler and The Nazis, Study Says」では、より明示的に今日の米国との比較を行っている。




という主旨のNBER論文上がっている論文のタイトルは「Austerity and the rise of the Nazi party」で、著者はGregori Galofré-Vilà(ボッコーニ大)、Christopher M. Meissner(UCデービス)、Martin McKee(ロンドン大学衛生熱帯医学大学院)、David Stuckler(ボッコーニ大)。


The current historical consensus on the economic causes of the inexorable Nazi electoral success between 1930 and 1933 suggests this was largely related to the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression (high unemployment and financial instability). However, these factors cannot fully account for the Nazi’s electoral success. Alternatively it has been speculated that fiscally contractionary austerity measures, including spending cuts and tax rises, contributed to votes for the Nazi party especially among middle- and upper-classes who had more to lose from them. We use voting data from 1,024 districts in Germany on votes cast for the Nazi and rival Communist and Center parties between 1930 and 1933, evaluating whether radical austerity measures, measured as the combination of tax increases and spending cuts, contributed to the rise of the Nazis. Our analysis shows that chancellor Brüning’s austerity measures were positively associated with increasing vote shares for the Nazi party. Depending on how we measure austerity and the elections we consider, each 1 standard deviation increase in austerity is associated with a 2 to 5 percentage point increase in vote share for the Nazis. Consistent with existing evidence, we find that unemployment rates were linked with greater votes for the Communist party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including a border-pair policy discontinuity design and alternative measures of radicalization such as Nazi party membership. The coalition that allowed a majority to form government in March 1933 might not have been able to form had fiscal policy been more expansionary.






BIS Quarterly Reviewの12月号の特集記事(Special features)の一つで、金融政策が民間部門の債務返済比率に与える影響についての研究結果を示している(H/T Mostly Economics)。記事のタイトルは「Is there a debt service channel of monetary transmission?」で、著者はBoris Hofmann(BIS)、Gert Peersman(ゲント大)。


Previous research has explored the impact of private sector debt service ratios (DSRs), ie debt payments relative to income, on medium-term macroeconomic outcomes. This special feature, based on a study of 18 economies, finds that monetary policy shocks, in turn, have a significant impact on DSRs. We show that a monetary tightening leads to a significant and persistent increase in DSRs, with higher effective lending rates on the stock of debt outweighing a decline in the debt-to-income ratio. Moreover, the impact of monetary policy shocks on DSRs, as well as on economic activity, the price level, house prices and credit, turns out to be significantly larger in high-debt economies. These findings point to the existence of a debt service channel of monetary transmission.







Update: Robert Waldmann looks at the issue, concluding "no one has made an algebra mistake. Taxes on capital and capital income are different."




Now I think the actual lesson here is that it makes no sense to look at a long term change divided by a short term change.




DeLong scolds Mankiw very harshly for using the word "static" with a different definition that the JCT. I personally wonder why Mankiw thinks anyone should be interested in a (long run)/(short run) ratio.




Stepping back, one might consider a (long term)/(short term) ratio an odd thing to calculate. One might consider it a mistake to suggest it is a policy relevant ratio. But it isn't an algebra mistake




なお、上の論者の誰も指摘していないが、マンキューの「静学的ファーマン比率」で小生がもう一つ問題だと思うのが、分母のdxは静学的だとしても、分子のdwの算出についてはdkを考慮し、それをモデルの第一式(r = (1-t)f '(k))から導出している点である。従って、分母と分子の仮定がちぐはぐな比率になっており、経済学的な意味が損なわれているように思われる。



  1. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下しない短期では、賃金は上昇しない。
  2. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下しない短期に、税収は(Δt)(k)(r/(1-t))だけ低下する。
  3. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下しない短期に、利益は(Δt)(k)(r/(1-t))だけ上昇する*3
  4. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下するが、発注した投資がまだ執行されない中期に、賃金は(Δt)(k)(r/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)])だけ上昇する*4
  5. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下するが、発注した投資がまだ執行されない中期に、税収は(Δt)(k)(r/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)])だけ低下する。
  6. 課税前の資本の収益率が低下するが、発注した投資がまだ執行されない中期に、利益は当初の水準に戻る。
  7. 資本ストックが均衡に達する長期では、賃金は(Δt)(k)(r/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)]) + {ハーバーガーの三角項}だけ上昇する。
  8. 資本ストックが均衡に達する長期では、税収は(Δt)(k)(r/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)]) - {rtΔk[1/(1-t+Δt) -1]}だけ低下する*5
  9. 資本ストックが均衡に達する長期では、利益はrΔkだけ上昇する。
  10. 資本ストックが均衡に達する長期では、そうした追加利益は海外に流れ、GDPGNP乖離が拡大する…。
  11. 政治的ノイズを削除し、バイアスと変動の望ましいトレードオフを得るためにΔk = 0としたJCTやOTAやCBOなどの「完全に静学的な」計算では、(Δt)(k)(r/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)])だけ賃金は上昇し、税収は低下する。



*1:ちなみに小生はその指摘をデロングのエントリのコメント欄に投稿している(ただしそのコメントでdw/dxの式を間違えている[1/(1+f '(k)/f "(k)*k)ではなく1/{1+(f '(k)*t)/(f "(k)*k)}が正しい])。なお、その後デロングは、ここで紹介したエントリで、「Mankiw correctly calculates kdτ when he is calculating the change in wages...But messes up when he calculates:dTR...」と書いている。

*2cf. デロング自身のブログのエントリ、今回のワルドマンのエントリのきっかけになったと思しきマンキューの12/5エントリに反応したエントリ


*4:デロングのコメント(ないし12/9エントリ)によれば、資本の一単位当たりの税引き前借り入れコストの低下により追加的なキャッシュフロー r/(1-t) - r/(1-t+Δt) = rΔt/[(1-t)(1-t+Δt)] が生じ、それに資本ストックkを掛けたものが賃上げに充てることのできる総キャッシュフローということになる。あるいは微分式を考えるならば、本ブログの10/26エントリで引用したデロングのτ = tr/(1-t)という関係式からdτ = rdt/(1-t)2となるので、それを賃金上昇=kdτ(図のqのエリアで、税収減少に等しい)に代入したもの、と考えることもできる。デロングは、マンキューも賃金上昇に利用可能なキャッシュフローの計算ではこのように税引き前利益が税率引き下げの影響を即座に受けると前提したのに対し、税収の計算では影響を即座に受けないという前提を置いたために食い違いが生じた、と指摘し、「資本への課税と資本所得への課税は別物である」というのが食い違いの原因だというワルドマンの見方を否定している。





先月末にイタリア銀行が資金循環勘定をテーマとしたコンファレンスを開催し、そのオープニング講演で同行のルイジ・シニョリーニ(Luigi Federico Signorini)副総裁資金循環勘定の歴史を振り返っている(H/T Mostly Economics)。

Real national accounts had begun to be compiled following the Keynesian revolution, as the invention of macroeconomics and the definition of the attending concepts (income, consumption, investment, savings) prompted the development of statistical methods to produce a reasonable approximation of the real-world counterparts to those concepts. The first release of the United Nations’ Systems of National Accounts came in 1947. Once the statistical foundations for real national accounts had been laid, moving on to financial accounts seemed natural. As we were soon to learn, this was no easy task. Even more, making the two sets of macro accounts consistent, i.e. integrated – a logical and easy step in theory – was in fact very difficult in practice.

The effort to understand and possibly control business cycles after the devastation of the Great Depression was itself a powerful driving force for the development of financial accounts. Financial variables such as bank loans and deposits, bonds and shares, arranged within a consistent framework, were seen as necessary to get a full picture of the cyclical factors in the economy.

The availability of information on financial flows may also have been regarded in those days as instrumental to economic planning; in some Western countries this was considered a very important and effective tool of economic policy in the post-war period. With illusions of top-down planning long forgotten in many market economies, this point is easily overlooked nowadays, but it was surely another significant factor in those times.






There was a golden age of financial accounts between the 1960s and the early 1970s. James Tobin, among others, used them to look at the way agents allocate wealth across financial and non-financial assets; in his Nobel Memorial Lecture in 1981, he discussed ‘Money and finance in the macro-economic process’ using flow-of-fund tables. ...

Interest in financial accounts declined in the 1980s, only to pick up again after the crisis. ...

Financial accounts continued to be used, though to a lesser extent, by economists such as Wynne Godley and Raymond Goldsmith. Then the Asian crisis of the late 1990s showed the importance of sectoral financial connections and the need to study the balance sheets of banks, firms, and households. Since the start of monetary union, the ECB’s monetary analytical framework has included financial accounts as a tool for cross-checking its ‘first pillar’ (economic analysis) against its ‘second pillar’ (monetary analysis).

However, it was the global financial crisis that generated renewed interest. A lesson of the crisis was that tracking sectoral imbalances was important; that an excessive level of debt may cause vulnerabilities; and that therefore the pursuit of financial stability required monitoring the level of corporate and household debt and the leverage of financial institutions. Finance was no longer a mere veil.