Judis: So we are get down to nitty-gritty Let’s go back to the three steps for rebalancing trade agreements and to American trade policy. Do you think Trump was right to abandon TPP?

Rodrik: Yes.

Judis:. There are a lot of people who thought it was a good idea on geopolitical if not economic grounds. It was a way to strengthen America’s position in Asia against that of China.

Rodrik: I think many people thought the economics was unimportant and that geopolitically it was a way of getting Asia to play by American rules and counterbalancing China and so forth. Whether that is good or not, whether that made sense or not from geopolitical standpoint, I think it is crazy to have a trade agreements which is extremely contentious politically and which contains a lot of elements that are highly problematic and use it for geopolitical reasons. If you want to achieve a geopolitical agreement not an economic agreement, do that. I think it was very dishonest and very inappropriate.

On the economics, it is another instance of a trade agreement that would have produced aggregate gains that were really miniscule. The best that the most pro-TPP economists could produce was an estimate that it would increase US GDP 0.4 percent after 10 years. And that included all kinds of assumptions of how employment would not be affected and workers would move to new jobs and new opportunities and so forth, stuff we know from earlier that we doesn’t happen, Even in the best circumstances, the overall gains were miniscule.

Then it had really problematic elements. The one I find the most problematic in these new trade agreements is the ISDS, the investor state dispute settlement, which is an abomination. [The TPP would have established independent tribunals that corporations could use to file suit to overturn national regulations.] I think it is a derogation of domestic legal standards and it undermines the integrity of a domestic regulatory and judicial system.







Rodrik: ...Nationally we have democratic institutions for deciding who benefits from markets and how resources and income are to be distributed. Internationally, all we have are tool shops and arrangements whereby trade lawyers and technocrats decide on a global agenda without any of the legitimacy or authority that you have at the national level. When you look at it from that perspective, I am not surprised at the backlash against the international arrangements that were created in the 1990s and that have led the push to globalization.

Judis: Are you saying that in the ‘90s, the United States should have been much more wary and cautious when it helped to found the main international trade group, the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 1995?

Rodrik: A lot of wrong turns were taken in the 1990s. The WTO had some good things in it, but as a trade regime, it exemplifies global overreach. It tries to fix global standards for intellectual property rights, industrial policies, and various health and safety regulations. As a result, it reached into areas that are more properly a national responsibility and where the argument for global harmonization is quite weak. It was bad economics that resulted in a loss of legitimacy for the global trade regime.

Another wrong turn came in what the United States didn’t do when it opened its economy with NAFTA, the WTO, and then the entry of China into the WTO. At some point, the United States could have done what Europe did in an earlier stage in this history when Europe became an open economy. That is to erect very generous social insurance and safety nets. The kind of insecurities and anxiety that openness to trade creates can be compensated or neutralized by having extensive social policies, and that’s what Europe managed to do.

Europe is much more open to trade in the United States. Yet to this day, trade remains uncontroversial in Europe. When you look at populism in Europe, it’s not about trade at all. It is about other things, it is about immigrants going to reduce the welfare state.

Judis: But aren’t populists in southern Europe and France up in arms about Germany and its trade balance?

Rodrik: It’s about macro finance, it’s about the role of Brussels, it is not about putting trade restrictions on China and Mexico. In Britain, the Brexiteers wanted to leave Europe in part so that they could pursue free trade policies unencumbered by Brussels. The issue of trade and import competition was largely neutralized as a political issue in Europe by the tradeoff of a generous welfare state. When the United States became an open economy in the ‘80s and ‘90s, it largely went the other way. We didn’t try to erect a stronger safety net. If anything, the safety net was allowed to erode. That I think was a major wrong turn and we are paying the price for that now.

Judis: If you look back at the 1996 election, and Bill Clinton’s speeches, when he said change is our friend, he was saying what you’re saying. He was talking about a more generous welfare state, mainly in terms of education and health care. And in his second term, before the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke, and Republicans began impeaching him, he wanted to expand Medicare, and other programs,

Rodrik: You’re right, there was a fork in the road. I do remember that. I remember my stuff getting cited at that time [Has Globalization Gone Too Far? came out in March 1997], but in fact there wasn’t much action. There was a general problem even with the center-left. You heard let’s liberalize finance and let’s do trade agreements and don’t worry then we’ll have compensation and the education and the transfers. In the end, we got a lot of the first and very little of the second, and that’s how I think the center lost its credibility.


おっしゃる通りで、それが分岐点でした。そのことは覚えています。当時私の著書[1997年3月発売の「Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*1」]が引用されたものでした。しかし実際のところ、行動はあまりなされませんでした。中道左派でさえも、一般的な問題を抱えていたのです。金融を自由化し貿易協定を結ぼう、補償と教育と所得移転をするから心配しなくて良い、という話がされましたが、最終的には前者は大いに実施され、後者はほとんど実施されませんでした。それで中道は信認を失った、と私は思います。





Judis: You talked earlier about changing trade agreements so that they reflect the interests of labor rather than capital. But the main thing you mentioned in explaining it is allowing increased visas for guest workers. That wouldn’t seem to benefit a host nation’s workers. Look at the abuse of H-1B visas in the United States.

Rodrik: That’s true. But is also depends on how you manage it. If am a worker in the United States or Europe, would I rather compete with a Bangladeshi workers who is working in Bangladesh under Bangladeshi labor standards and rules and exporting goods into my market or would I rather compete with him in the United States or Europe earning American and European wages and operating under our labor standards? I would much rather than have the second.

Temporary labor mobility schemes would regularize something that is already happening, but informally and with much greater damage to labor markets and countries. They would also improve labor standards of the workers with whom you are competing. I would add it’s not only about guest worker schemes. It is also about much better safety nets. It’s about social dumping.


We protect workers from competition from other domestic workers. I can’t hire workers in the United States who work below minimum wage, but I can compete back door by outsourcing to a company in Bangladesh and doing it that way. So social dumping is essentially a mechanism that undermines domestic labor standards and other norms. Preventing it would be one way of changing the rules to make them more symmetric with respect to how we treat businesses and workers.


確かにそうです。ただ、それはやり方次第、という面もあります。欧米の労働者として、バングラディッシュ国内にてバングラディッシュの労働基準や規則の下で働いていて我々の市場に商品を輸出しているバングラディッシュ人労働者と、欧米にて欧米水準の賃金を得て我々の労働基準の下で働いているバングラディッシュ人労働者のどちらと競争したいでしょうか? 後者でしょう。

ダンピングダンピング 2017/06/25 10:38 http://sekaitabi.com/victoriasecet.html 
必ずしも”米国では最低賃金以下で働く労働者を雇うことはできません。” という命題は真ではないですね。




というUnlearning Economics(UE)のツイート画像をMostly Economicsが紹介している(なお、Mostly EconomicsはUEの経済学者ネタとして紹介しているが、元画像にはfacebook.com/Mathmaticxという小さな注釈が付いており、UEは、2番目が経済学でありがち、という趣旨のコメントを付けている)。


第3章:この証明は、定理をさらに追究した後の第7章に回す。 第7章:簡単化のためz=0の場合のみ証明するが、一般的な場合については付録Cに記述する。 付属C:正式な証明は本書の範囲を超えるが、当然ながら我々は直観的にそれが事実であることを知っている。




というブルームバーグコラムを、利上げ前の13日にコチャラコタ書いている原題は「The Fed's Unspoken Mandate」)。

The U.S. Federal Reserve’s two main goals are to promote maximum employment and keep inflation close to 2 percent. But it also acts as if it has another, unspoken mandate: Don’t do anything too radical in pursuit of those goals. This allegiance to what’s considered “normal” harms a lot of people, black Americans in particular.





I’m often asked how the Fed can use the rather blunt tool of monetary policy to mitigate racial inequities. One simple answer: Stop putting so much weight on the unspoken mandate of “normal” monetary policy. This would help all Americans, and -- assuming historical patterns hold true -- particularly black Americans.

This week, the Fed will probably increase its short-term interest-rate target by another quarter percentage point and announce plans to shrink its bond holdings. Officials will portray the moves as necessary to “normalize” monetary policy, providing further evidence that the unspoken mandate is a key shaper of Fed policy, and that all Americans -- especially black Americans -- remain needlessly exposed to excessive economic risk.




KRKR 2017/06/23 12:04 http://d.hatena.ne.jp/himaginary/20140419/summers_INET_interview