チリでの年金民営化を労働・社会保障大臣として成功させ、その後、ケイトー研究所のシニアフェローとして世界に年金民営化を広める伝道師となっているホセ・ピネラ(José Piñera)が、クリントン政権時代に米国での年金改革の実現に尽力した経緯を同研究所のサイトに記している(H/T Mostly Economicsの表題のエントリ*1)。


Then, in his January 1998 State of the Union address, President Clinton warned the nation of the coming Social Security crisis and called for an open debate on the needed reforms: “We will hold a White House conference on Social Security in December. And one year from now, I will convene the leaders of Congress to craft historic bipartisan legislation to achieve a landmark for our generation, a Social Security system that is strong in the 21st century.”

On the heels of this speech, I realized that no momentum could be lost. I needed to reach the president himself. Knowing Clinton’s reputation as a voracious reader, I resolved to write an open letter to the president in a major newspaper, where he was sure to take notice. And so that April, at a Tokyo conference organized by the Cato Institute and the powerful Keidanren, the Japanese business association, I broached the idea of my open letter to a fellow speaker, George Melloan of the Wall Street Journal. He told me it was highly unusual for the Journal to publish such a piece, but after reading a draft he enthusiastically accepted. Melloan asked me to send it by fax to the Journal’s Americas columnist Mary O’Grady in New York. From the Imperial Hotel my Cato colleague Bob Borens and I spent the whole night exchanging faxes between Tokyo and downtown New York, revising every comma of the draft until we were all fully satisfied.

The letter was published on the editorial page on April 10, 1998. In it I described the success of the Chilean reform and urged the president to embrace a private-accounts option for Social Security, to avert the looming insolvency and to spread wealth more widely.





この公開書簡を出した後ピネラは、米大統領経済顧問のジーン・スパーリングから、12月のコンファレンスにおいて年金の民間口座について講演するように依頼される(唯一の非米国人講演者だったとの由)。そして翌1999年1月の一般教書演説クリントンは、普遍的貯蓄口座(universal savings accounts=USA accounts)の設立構想を打ち出す。しかしその構想はモニカ・ルインスキーのスキャンダルによって水泡に帰すことになった、とピネラは極めて残念そうに回想している。

チリの年金改革については、「チリ 年金」でぐぐると日本語でも様々な文献が見つかる。ピネラについては、例えばこちらの本では肯定的に描かれているが、こちらのレポートのケイトー研究所に関する記述では否定的に評価されている。

*1原題は「A tale of Chilean social security system and how Lewinsky prevented reform of the same in US….」。

*2cf. ここ




前回、昨年のFRBの政策を誤りと指弾したデビッド・ベックワースのエントリを紹介したが、「More on the Fed's Mistake of 2015」と題した後続エントリベックワースは、以下の図を紹介している。

これはInvestor’s Business DailyのJed Grahamが書いた1/29付け記事からの引用である。ベックワースは記事本文から以下の一節を引用している。

Janet Yellen’s Federal Reserve has done something that no other Fed has done since Paul Volcker aimed to quash runaway inflation in the early 1980s, even if it meant a recession — and it did.

New Commerce Department data out Friday show that nominal GDP grew at a 1.5% annualized rate in the fourth quarter, casting further doubt on the Fed’s decision to begin hiking its key interest rate in December. (Inflation-adjusted GDP rose just 0.7% in Q4.)With the exception of Volcker’s interest-rate hike in early 1982 amid a recession, no other Fed has raised rates during a quarter in which nominal GDP grew less than 3%, dating back to the early 1970s.





  • 名目GDP成長率が4%以下の時の金利引き上げでさえ稀で、1983年から2014年の間に2回しか起きていない。
    • しかもそのうちの1回(1986年の第2四半期)は、その前に0.5ポイント引き下げたうちの0.125ポイントを巻き戻した格好になっている。
    • 従って、ボルカー以来、名目GDP成長率が4%以下の四半期にネットベースで金利を引き上げたのは1995年第1四半期のみ。ただ、その時も、次の1997年初めの引き上げの前に3回引き下げを行っている。
  • 年率ではなく前年同期比を見た場合、名目GDP成長率が3%以下の時に引き上げたのはイエレンのみとなる。
    • 2014年第4四半期からの名目成長率は1.9%。
    • 年次の名目成長率が5%以下の時にFRBが引き上げを行ったのは他には3回のみ。うち1回は名目成長率が4.9%だった1986年で、他の2回は名目成長率が3.2%だった1982年のボルカー景気後退期。







というタイトルのデビッド・ベックワースのエントリが少し前にEconomist's Viewで流れて原題は「The Fed Did Not Make A Mistake In December」)、一瞬、「え、ベックワースが金利引き上げ擁護?」と思ったが、中身を読むとやはりベックワースはベックワースだったので安心した次第。


Many observers are now viewing the Fed's decision in December to raise interest rates as a "policy error". With volatility in financial markets, falling commodity prices, and a fourth quarter slowdown many believe the Fed got ahead of the recovery with the December interest rate hike. Some even are even calling it a "huge mistake"or a "historic rate hike mistake". One person even called it an "epic mistake".

I see things differently. The Fed did not make a mistake in December. It made a mistake all last year by talking up interest rate hikes and signalling a tightening of future monetary policy. Since markets are forward looking, this expectation got priced into the market and affected decision making. The Fed did this even though the economy was not back at full employment. The December rate hike was just a confirmation of these expectations.

The Fed, in other words, got ahead of the recovery well before December. Damage was already being inflicted on the economy by the time the actual rate hike occurred, as seen in the figures below. They all show the 12-month ahead expected federal funds rate plotted against various economic indicators.






So no, the Fed did not make a mistake at its December meeting. It made a mistake over the entire past year and now we are seeing the fruition of this error.







LSAPS do have limitations as a monetary policy tool. The big problem is that it always seemed that the Fed had some cap in mind. Now, that cap, and the relative comfort with large holdings of assets, evolved over time. But, I think, markets always got the message: “OK, the Fed is doing this, but at the end of the day there is some cap on what they are going to do.” The only time when that might not have been true was for a brief period between September 2012 and April-May 2013 when people talked about QE infinity. But as long as there’s a point beyond which you are not willing to go, QE has its limitations as a policy tool.

The other tool we used was forward guidance. Here, I have somewhat different lessons from others. I think that the use of quantitative, state-contingent, guidance was broadly effective and useful. The challenges were on the communication front. With the benefit of hindsight, we were a bit oblique in the way we communicated. Saying things like "We're going to keep the federal fund rate extraordinarily low at least until the unemployment rate gets to 6.5%" created in the minds of many observers the impression that once we reached 6.5%, the Fed would raise rates. We didn't actually say that. But we should have made clear exactly what we meant when the unemployment rate gets below 6.5%.

This is a long-winded way of saying that economists and lawyers, who are by and large the people around the FOMC table, aren’t necessarily the best group to figure out how to communicate effectively using this tool. There needs to be input from communications experts and others on how we can do a better job of shaping expectations using forward guidance.

Date-contingent guidance has been a challenge for the Fed that led to all sorts of problems. Even in 2015, a number of Federal Open Market Committee participants offered date-based guidance, saying in effect that 2015 was the year for hiking interest rates. They did not mean that as a commitment, but markets took it that way. So, I think the Fed was a little bit boxed in at the December 2015 meeting (where I did not take part).

That’s just the latest example of how date-contingent guidance is never meant as a commitment—it’s always a forecast. It’s meant to be Delphic rather than Odyssean, to use President Evans's language. But, the FOMC ends up in a box because conditions change and then the Committee is stuck with what it said. I remain a big fan of quantitative state-contingent forward guidance. But I believe that more qualitative, vague or date-contingent guidance works poorly and that the Fed should stay away from it going forward.







基礎固め基礎固め 2016/02/06 00:39 すみませんが整理するための駄文を書かせていただきますと。









日銀マイナス金利政策を受けてコチャラコタが自HPに簡単な論評を書いているが、同じ日(2/1)にMoneyandBankingブログ掲載されたインタビューで概ね同内容のことをより簡潔に語っているので、以下に引用してみる(いずれもEconomist’s View経由。ただしインタビュー自体は日銀の政策実施前のものと思われる)。

Another important aspect of the tool kit regards negative interest rates. In the past, I have written down economic models where the interest rate is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero. However, we have certainly learned from the experience in Europe that it’s not. And, I think that is something that should be explored by other major central banks, namely the Bank of England, the Fed, and the Bank of Japan. There are conversations about raising inflation targets to say 4%. But, if you can set the interest rate at -150 (“minus 150”) basis points, you've achieved much of the same result without creating the distortion that higher inflation brings. So, there is quite a bit to be gained from thinking about how low interest rates can go.

One final thing to say is that these unconventional tools would be more effective, the more they are treated as conventional. Treating them as “break the glass” instruments of policy robs them of their effectiveness because every time you bring them out, you will be signalling that things are going very badly. You want to treat your entire policy tool kit as conventional. For example, on negative interest rates, it should be made clear that there is no zero lower bound, and you should communicate ahead of time how low you are willing to go.